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INTRODUCTION
Delaware’s position as the nation’s leader in corporate law is well
established.1 Equally well established, although perhaps less well
known except among corporate law scholars, is that Delaware’s leadership is the result of its Court of Chancery being the center for stockholder litigation against corporate fiduciaries.2 What has been
unknown, until recently, is that Delaware’s position as the center for
* Frank McDonald Endowed Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. I
greatly benefitted from Boston University School of Law’s Third Annual Workshop for Corporate & Securities Litigation held on October 2 and 3, 2015; special thanks to Professors Jessica
Erickson, David Webber, and Verity Winship who organized the workshop.
1. See ERIC A. CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 133 (3d ed.
2014) [hereinafter CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS].
2. John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1347 (2012); John Armour
et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 606 (2012); Eric A.
Chiappinelli, The Underappreciated Importance of Personal Jurisdiction in Delaware’s Success,
63 DEPAUL L. REV. 911, 912 (2014) [hereinafter Chiappinelli, Underappreciated Importance];
John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915,
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stockholder litigation is the result of Delaware’s two unique systems
for obtaining personal jurisdiction over corporate fiduciaries.3 Since
1977, Delaware’s system has been premised upon implied consent to
obtain personal jurisdiction over fiduciaries.4 That system is very
likely unconstitutional, as I have argued elsewhere.5
Until 1977, Delaware used a system of attachment called sequestration to obtain personal jurisdiction. Sequestration was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner.6 In
this Article, I describe the surprising way in which two major changes
in American constitutional law led to Shaffer. Both of these changes
are well known. Yet those changes are neither doctrinally related to
each other nor is either one obviously related to corporate law.
The economic background for this story started in the late nineteenth century when the modern form of large business enterprise
emerged. Concomitant with that emergence came the innovation of
the pseudo-domestic corporation. That is, a corporation deliberately
incorporated in a state where the corporation did little or no business
and in which it was not headquartered.7 I lay out this background in
Part II.8
By the post-World War I era, stockholder litigation against corporate fiduciaries was an important check on managerial authority. In
the mid-1930s, the frequency of that litigation greatly increased.9 A
continuing and difficult problem in this litigation was finding a state in
which personal jurisdiction could be had over both the corporation
and the fiduciaries. The rules for personal jurisdiction were clear
under Pennoyer v. Neff,10 but their application to stockholder litigation was problematic. Part III details the personal jurisdiction rules as
they applied to stockholder litigation in the years after Pennoyer and
why stockholder litigation presented such intractable jurisdictional
hurdles.11
1951–52 (2012); Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger
Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1054–55 (2013).
3. Chiappinelli, Underappreciated Importance, supra note 2, at 932–41.
4. Id. at 944.
5. Eric A. Chiappinelli, The Myth of Director Consent: After Shaffer, Beyond Nicastro, 37
DEL. J. CORP. L. 783, 785 (2013) [hereinafter Chiappinelli, Myth].
6. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
7. Chiappinelli, Myth, supra note 5, at 788 n.29.
8. See infra notes 23–58 and accompanying text.
9. George D. Hornstein, Rights of Stockholders in the New York Courts, 56 YALE L.J. 942,
949 (1947).
10. 95 U.S. 714, 735–36 (1877).
11. See infra notes 59–113 and accompanying text.
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Sequestration was unique to the Delaware Court of Chancery. No
other state could have established the same system. In Part IV, I describe in detail how sequestration developed and how it operated. Sequestration was rooted in the concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction that
had been approved in Pennoyer.12 In the 1920s, the constitutionality
of a parallel procedure for Delaware’s Superior Court was upheld in
the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Ownbey v. Morgan.13 The
Delaware courts upheld sequestration against similar constitutional
challenges as well. Despite the availability of sequestration as a solution to the personal jurisdiction problem, it was New York, rather
than Delaware, that was the original center for stockholder litigation.
But, by the 1960s, Delaware replaced New York as the litigation
center, largely because of sequestration’s availability, as Part V
demonstrates.14
In the early 1960s, academics realized that the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 1945 decision in International Shoe v. Washington15 could be
expanded to apply to individual defendants as well as corporate
ones.16 Taken on its own terms, and taken in the context of the case
itself, the opinion in International Shoe was not a sea change in personal jurisdiction. It was the invention of the modern understanding
of International Shoe, which came nearly two decades after the decision itself, that marked the beginning of the end for sequestration.
The invention of International Shoe was the first doctrinal shift that
affected Delaware’s sequestration system.
In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court began the second doctrinal shift, a
revolution between debtors and their creditors.17 Within a decade,
that area of law completely changed. While many of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions involved consumer debt, the Court’s 1972 decision in Fuentes v. Shevin18 made it clear that the Court intended to
extend the revolution to property rights more broadly. Fuentes was
the second doctrinal shift that ensured the demise of sequestration.
Part VI illuminates the invention of International Shoe and the revolution in debtors’ rights.19
Part VI also makes clear that in the mid-1970s, academics and
courts outside of Delaware used the modern interpretation of Interna12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra notes 114–87
256 U.S. 94 (1921).
See infra notes 188–99
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See infra notes 206–09
See infra Part VI.B.
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
See infra notes 200–51

and accompanying text.
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tional Shoe and the debtors’ rights cases to question the continued
constitutionality of sequestration.20 Those arguments culminated in
Shaffer in 1977, which is described in Part VII.21 The Coda, Part VIII,
briefly summarizes Delaware’s surprising response to Shaffer.22
II. THE CORPORATE LAW LANDSCAPE
The number of large businesses that came into existence between
approximately 1870 and 1900 increased exponentially thanks to the
completion of the transportation and information infrastructures
throughout the country.23 In other words, the nationwide railroads,
the telegraph, and the telephone permitted large business entities to
coordinate their activities, which allowed those entities to conduct
business throughout the country. These enterprises were routinely organized as corporations.24 Many smaller business firms, which operated either as sole proprietorships or small partnerships, also
incorporated during those decades.25
Obviously, from an early day, corporations chartered in one state
would do business in,26 or at least seek to sue on obligations in,27
other states. By the early 1880s, corporate charters frequently included the explicit power to do business outside the state of incorporation,28 and by mid-decade, that power was implied.29 Conversely,
other states permitted foreign corporations30 to do business within
them under a doctrine of comity.31
As is true today, a foreign corporation doing business in a state was
subject to that state’s laws, just as a nonresident individual within that
state was subject to that state’s laws.32 However, the corporation’s
powers and the relations between the corporation, its stockholders, its
20. See infra notes 252–319 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 320–67 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 368–71 and accompanying text.
23. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND 285 (1977).
24. See id.
25. See VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 29, 157 (1970).
26. E.g., LaFayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404 (1855) (Indiana insurance company sold
insurance in Ohio).
27. E.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839) (Georgia bank sought to bring suit in
Alabama).
28. VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN
CHARITABLE § 501 (1882) [hereinafter MORAWETZ, FIRST EDITION].
29. 2 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 958 (2d
ed. 1886) [hereinafter MORAWETZ, SECOND EDITION].
30. A foreign corporation does business or has its headquarters in a state other than the one
in which it is incorporated. CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 129–30.
31. MORAWETZ, FIRST EDITION, supra note 28, § 502.
32. Id. § 505.
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directors, and its officers were circumscribed by the state of incorporation’s law, not that of any other state in which the corporation did
business. The theory behind this approach was that the state that created a corporation retained complete control over what powers to
grant the corporation and its constituents. Again, through a doctrine
of comity, other states would not apply their law to determine a foreign corporation’s powers33 or determine the rights and obligations
among stockholders, officers, directors, and the corporation. Put
more modernly, states declined to apply their local law to what has
come to be called the internal affairs of foreign corporations.34
Many courts declined to hear cases involving the internal affairs of
foreign corporations on the ground of either lack of competence35 or
forum non conveniens.36 Clearly, however, subject matter jurisdiction
could be had if a statute making the court competent were in effect,
and in fact, many courts did entertain these suits.37 When they did,
they applied the state of incorporation’s corporate law rather than
their own.38
These principles were geared to foreign corporations that conducted business in both their state of incorporation and other states as
well. However, some foreign corporations were formed to conduct
business only in states they were not incorporated in. By 1880 or so,
these corporations were sufficiently numerous that courts dealt with
them as a separate category of corporation.39 Presumably the promoters of these corporations and their legal advisors saw advantages in
the corporate law of foreign states. Or perhaps, if not corporate law
advantages, they at least found comparable corporate law provisions
but lower taxes in a foreign jurisdiction. Presumably, they also understood that the state of incorporation’s corporate law would govern the
internal affairs.
These entities came to be called “pseudo-foreign corporations,”40
or, regarding them from the point of view of the incorporating state,
“pseudo-domestic corporations.” In the nineteenth century they were
33. States made exceptions for corporate powers that were, by the 1880s, seen as public rather
than private powers. For example, even though a corporation might possess powers under its
charter, which would be valid in the state of incorporation, other states would not recognize a
foreign corporation’s power to condemn property or its right to a monopoly in a certain business. Id. § 508.
34. See id. § 506.
35. See, e.g., N. State Copper & Gold Min. Co. v. Field, 20 A. 1039, 1040–41 (Md. 1885).
36. E.g., Howell v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 51 Barb. 379, 385 (N.Y. 1868).
37. See e.g., Cent. Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U.S. 129, 132 (1894).
38. MORAWETZ, FIRST EDITION, supra note 28, § 506.
39. Id. at §§ 508, 513–14.
40. Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 137 (1955).
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referred to as “tramp corporations.”41 A number of courts dealt with
the question of whether tramp corporations had to be recognized in
other states, and most courts held that they did.42 Morawetz, the most
important late nineteenth century corporate law treatise writer supported tramp corporations, though other writers were more dubious.43
Small corporations doubtless retained the partnership management
structure in which the residual wealth owners were also the business
enterprise managers.44 That is, the corporation’s stockholders were
also its directors and officers. Large corporations developed a different structure, as Alfred D. Chandler documented.45 The control of
these large businesses, though not the actual ownership, shifted from
either the founding families or the bankers who supplied capital to the
managers who actually formulated and implemented strategic decisions for the company.46 The appearance of large business entities
and the separation in those companies of ownership from control created pressure on state corporation law. State corporation statutes in
the late nineteenth century were not drafted in anticipation of large
multi-state businesses.47
When large businesses developed, state statutes were slow to adapt
and frequently hostile to those businesses.48 However, in a somewhat
symbiotic process, as corporate planners recognized that the internal
affairs doctrine and judicial approval of tramp corporations effectively
allowed them to select the corporate law of any state, some states saw
an opportunity to increase their revenues by amending their corpora41. E.g., Kimball v. Davis, 52 Mo. App. 194, 213 (Mo. Ct. App. 1892). Kimball was the first to
use the term in print, though the opinion suggests the appellation was well known. The opinion
is by the distinguished corporate scholar and law journal editor, Seymour D. Thompson, who
also served as a Missouri court of appeals judge.
42. Troy & N. Car. Gold Min. Co. v. Snow Lumber Co., 92 S.E. 494, 495 (N.C. 1917) (recognizing a New York corporation, whose charter granted it the power to do business only in North
Carolina, as a valid foreign corporation); e.g., Newburg Petroleum Co. v. Weare, 27 Ohio St. 343,
352 (Ohio 1875); Second Nat’l Bank of Cin. v. Lovell, 13 Ohio Dec. Reprint 972, 973–74 (Sup.
Ct. Cincinnati 1873). But see Land Grant Ry & Trust Co. v. Coffey Cty. Com’rs, 6 Kan. 149,
153–54 (Kan. 1870) (noting that the corporation’s Pennsylvania charter granted it the power to
do business in any state except Pennsylvania, which doubtless influenced the Kansas court’s
decision).
43. Compare MORAWETZ, FIRST EDITION, supra note 28, § 508, with C. B. Ames, Tramp Corporations, 48 CENT. L.J. 391, 391 (1899).
44. CHANDLER, supra note 23, at 9.
45. Id. at 9–10.
46. See generally id. at 491–97.
47. William E. Kirk, III, A Case Study in Legislative Opportunism: How Delaware Used the
Federal-State System To Attain Corporate Pre-Eminence, 10 J. CORP. L. 233, 243–44 (1984).
48. E.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548–60 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See generally Kirk, supra note 47, 244–50.
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tion statutes or lowering their corporate taxes to attract pseudo-domestic incorporations.
New Jersey is traditionally considered the first state to have attracted significant pseudo-domestic incorporations.49 This attempt involved a corporation statute that allowed corporations more freedom
to operate, such as permitting a corporation to own stock in another
corporation, and allowed managers to increase their control over the
corporation by reducing the stockholders’ power.50 New Jersey’s efforts were enormously successful.51 Maine, Maryland, New York,
South Dakota, West Virginia, and possibly other states, attracted the
interest of corporate promoters looking to incorporate a tramp corporation, though not all of these states intended to compete for those
incorporations.52
Delaware began to compete with New Jersey for foreign incorporations when it ratified a new constitution in 1897 and adopted a new
corporation statute two years later, essentially enacting New Jersey’s
corporations statute wholesale.53 When New Jersey (at the behest of
Governor Woodrow Wilson) passed a number of reform acts, Delaware began to overtake New Jersey as the jurisdiction of choice for
corporate planners.54 By the end of World War I, Delaware dominated the market for pseudo-domestic incorporations, a position it has
not yet relinquished.55
49. See generally Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875–1929,
49 J. ECON. HIST. 677, 680–81 (1989); Kirk, supra note 47, at 247–49; Harwell Wells, The Modernization of Corporation Law, 1920–1940, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 573, 583–84 (2009); Charles M.
Yablon, The Historical Race: Competition for Corporate Charters and the Rise and Decline of
New Jersey: 1880-1910, 32 J. CORP. L. 323, 352–53 (2007).
50. See Kirk, supra note 47, at 247–48.
51. Id. at 249.
52. Grandy, supra note 49, at 685 (Maine, Maryland, New York, and West Virginia); Yablon,
supra note 49, at 361 n.226, 365 n.251, 366 (Maine, New York, South Dakota, and West Virginia).
53. Kirk, supra note 47, at 252–53.
54. In 1915, Delaware enacted a new corporations act that sought to take advantage of New
Jersey’s retreat from liberalizing corporation law. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF
THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970, at 148 (1970). See
generally Kirk, supra note 47, at 255–59. But, as Charles Yablon has put it:
Indeed, it is not too great an exaggeration to say that there has only been one dominant
state corporate law throughout American history: New Jersey law. It is just that, after
1913, Delaware was perceived by corporate lawyers and promoters as a more reliable
custodian of their conception of New Jersey law than New Jersey itself.
Yablon, supra note 49, at 330.
55. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, 206 n.18 (1932) (“Of the whole list [of the 573 NYSE actively traded listed
companies in 1928], 148 of the 573 corporations hold Delaware charters, most of them relatively
recent; New York is second with 121, most of them relatively old; New Jersey third with 87, most
of which grow [sic] out of the great merger period from 1898-1910.”); HURST, supra note 54, at
148; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering
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The end of World War I brought another development that bore on
the problem of personal jurisdiction in stockholder litigation. From
1919 onward, common stock in large corporations was intentionally
marketed to individual investors who lived outside the financial centers of the Northeast.56 By the post-war era, these corporations no
longer had controlling shareholders. In fact, no minority shareholder
owned any significant percentage of stock. Further, the stockholders
of these corporations were dispersed throughout the country.
These developments: (1) the validation of foreign incorporation; (2)
Delaware’s primacy for pseudo-domestic incorporations, especially
large, publicly traded corporations; (3) the separation of ownership
from control in large corporations; and (4) the dispersion of stock
ownership, set the stage for the problem of personal jurisdiction in
stockholder litigation.
The confluence of these developments helped create two new
problems in corporate law. First, the rise of corporations doing business nationally, the validation of tramp corporations, and the dispersion of stock ownership meant that litigation involving corporate law
issues might be brought in a state other than the state of incorporation. Second, the separation of ownership from control meant that
stockholder derivative litigation became the primary check on director power.57 When large corporations were controlled by either the
founding families or the corporations’ investment bankers, those constituencies could exert effective constraints on the board. With the
wide dispersion of share ownership, no stockholder, or even any feasibly assembled group of stockholders, could restrain director action.58
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION ISSUES IN STOCKHOLDER LITIGATION
AFTER PENNOYER
Two kinds of litigation involving corporations need to be distinguished. First is the ordinary suit by or against the corporation and
involving a party opponent independent of the corporation. Second is
what has come to be called derivative litigation, in which a stockthe Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 578 (2002) (claiming that 85% of
publicly traded, nonfinancial, pseudo-domestic corporations are incorporated in Delaware);
Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1605 tbl.A1,
1608 tbl.A4 (2002) (showing that well over 80% of public pseudo-domestic corporations and
over 95% of corporations going public incorporate in Delaware).
56. JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 177 (1997); CAROSSO, supra note 25, at 249–54.
57. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 55, at 277.
58. Id. at 94. In 1930, 130 of the 200 largest corporations were controlled by management. Id.
These 130 corporations owned 80% of the 200 corporations’ total assets. Id.
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holder brings suit to enforce a right belonging to the corporation.
Through the nineteenth century, derivative litigation was undertaken
to enforce corporate rights against third parties.
Frequently, derivative litigation was used to challenge taxes imposed on the corporation. The stockholder alleged that the tax was
illegal, that the corporation had a right not to pay the tax, and that the
stockholder was suing to vindicate that right.59 More germane to our
inquiry, however, were derivative suits in which the party opponent
was in fact an officer, a director, or, in many instances, the entire
board of directors. In these cases, the theory was that the defendant
had caused harm to the corporation, the corporation would not bring
suit because the defendant controlled it, and the stockholder was suing to vindicate the corporation’s right to be made whole by the
wrong-doing director or officer.60
One procedural issue that arose in both kinds of litigation was personal jurisdiction over the corporation. From the beginning it was
clear that a state could exercise personal jurisdiction over its domestic
corporations.61 Personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations proved
more complicated. The theory on which personal jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation could be asserted was clear from 1877 onward.62
However, the application of that theory quickly led to a large body of
case law that culminated in International Shoe in 1945.63 Simply put, a
state could assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation if
the corporation either consented to jurisdiction or was present within
the forum state.64
Consent was typically obtained in advance by conditioning permission to do business within a state on registering with the state. States
had at least some power to prevent foreign corporations from doing
business within their borders and so could condition permission to do
business on reasonable terms. The registration process required either explicit consent to personal jurisdiction or the appointment of an
agent within the state on whom service of process could be made.65
Presence was conceptually more attenuated. Because a corporation
is a separate entity from its stockholders or directors, the presence of
59. E.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331 (1855).
60. See, e.g., Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162 (Ohio 1831).
61. See Austin W. Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32
HARV. L. REV. 871, 878 (1919).
62. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S 369, 375–76 (1877).
63. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
64. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722; Schollenberger, 96 U.S at 377–78.
65. Matthew Kipp, Inferring Express Consent: The Paradox of Permitting Registration Statutes
to Confer General Jurisdiction, 9 REV. LITIG. 1, 2, 12 (1990).
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officers or directors was irrelevant to whether the corporation was
present. Thus, service of process within the jurisdiction on an officer
or director was ineffective to confer jurisdiction over the corporation
if the corporation were not present.66
When was a foreign corporation present so that a state could assert
personal jurisdiction? When a corporation failed to comply with a registration statute but did business within a state, the corporation might
be found to be present but might also be found to have impliedly consented. In either event, personal jurisdiction, while not completely
predictable in advance, was not particularly problematic.
As derivative litigation became more frequent, other procedural issues appeared. One form of indirect proof that derivative litigation
had become commonplace was the U.S. Supreme Court’s adoption of
Equity Rule 94 in 1882.67 That rule contained two requirements
meant to address perceived abuses in derivative suits. The first was
substantive and required the plaintiff to detail any efforts to obtain
relief from the corporation. In other words, Rule 94 embodied the
modern demand requirement.
The second principal requirement was purely procedural. It required the bill68 to state compliance with what has come to be called
the contemporaneous ownership rule.69 That is, the plaintiff must
have been a stockholder at the time of the action complained of.70
Although the contemporaneous ownership rule later embodied both a
shift in philosophical thought on the nature of the derivative suit and
was used to restrict such lawsuits, the purpose of Rule 94 was different.71 Just as in a situation involving an aggrieved individual, a corporation desiring to pursue a claim for relief (typically against a
government for imposing a tax the corporation believed was illegal
but also sometimes against an independent third party) might wish to
litigate in federal rather than state court. Throughout most of the
nineteenth century, the majority of federal lawsuits were based on di66. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1915); Conley v.
Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 406 (1903); Goldey v. Morning News of New Haven, 156 U.S.
518 (1895).
67. SUP. CT. R. EQ. 94, 104 U.S. ix (1882) (now FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)).
68. The bill was the first pleading in a suit in equity, which is equivalent to the complaint in
modern rules pleading. BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EQUITY PLEADING
§ 26 (1897).
69. SUP. CT. R. EQ. 94, 104 U.S. ix, ix–x.
70. Or, the bill must state that the plaintiff acquired the shares by operation of law.
71. Philosophically, the injury to the corporation was thought of as inhering in the shares
themselves, such that a subsequent purchaser could nevertheless maintain a derivative suit.
Later, the injury to the corporation was thought of as belonging derivatively to the stockholders
at the time of the injury. MORAWETZ, SECOND EDITION, supra note 29, §§ 265–66.
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versity jurisdiction.72 When, as frequently happened, the corporationplaintiff had a claim against a nondiverse defendant, such as the government of the state of incorporation, diversity was absent. Corporations created artificial diversity by arranging for a friendly stockholder
of diverse citizenship from the defendant to file a derivative suit.
In Hawes v. Oakland,73 the U.S. Supreme Court held that this behavior was collusive and that the federal courts did not have subject
matter jurisdiction in these cases.74 More importantly for our purposes, the U.S. Supreme Court evidently thought that these cases
were sufficiently frequent and that its holding in Hawes was inadequate to solve the problem, whereupon it amended the Equity Rules
to add Rule 94.75
In all stockholder litigation, personal jurisdiction over the corporation was required. Analytically, one might think that in stockholder
litigation against corporate fiduciaries the corporation itself need not
be made a party. Even in derivative actions, the stockholder-plaintiff
is suing because the corporation will not do so; thus, the stockholder is
not suing the corporation, but those whose actions are alleged to have
harmed the corporation. However, it was held early on in state
courts,76 and authoritatively by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1873, that
the corporation is an indispensable party in derivative litigation.77
This rule existed for two reasons. First, any recovery flowed not to
the plaintiff or other stockholders but to the corporation.78 Having
the corporation as a party facilitated effecting a remedy. Second,
under the principles of preclusion at the time, if the corporation were
not a party to the stockholder litigation, it would not be precluded
from filing a second action against the same defendants who would
thus be in danger of two judgments on the same claim.79
Are the directors or officers indispensable parties? In a case in
which a stockholder sues to enjoin the corporation from engaging in
an illegal act, such as paying an illegal tax or entering into or performing an ultra vires contract, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the corporation’s fiduciaries were not indispensable parties. This was based
72. Federal question jurisdiction was not granted generally until 1875. FELIX FRANKFURTER
& JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 64–65 (1927).
73. 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
74. Id. at 452–53, 459–61.
75. Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241, 248 (1887).
76. The leading state case is Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 233 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
77. Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 523 n.2 (1947); City of
Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S. 626, 627 (1873).
78. Dows, 85 U.S. at 627.
79. Id.
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on the theory that if the corporation were enjoined, all who have
power to make the corporation act would thereby be bound in their
official capacity as well.80
But, in the much more typical case in which a stockholder seeks
recompense for the corporation from the corporate fiduciaries who
have harmed the corporation, those fiduciaries are indispensable.81
However, because the liability is joint and several, a plaintiff need not
join every wrong-doing fiduciary, though of course, recovery may only
be had against those properly joined and served.82 This rule alleviated
one potential issue in stockholder litigation: the inability to obtain
personal jurisdiction over all the potential individual defendants in
one forum. The plaintiff could choose, for reasons of strategy, practicality (such as suing the defendants with the deepest pockets), or procedure, to sue some but not all possible fiduciary defendants.
For nearly seventy years, from Pennoyer to International Shoe, the
rules for personal jurisdiction over individuals were clear and could
usually be applied without difficulty. A state could assert personal
jurisdiction over: (1) any person physically present in the state when
served with process; (2) any domiciliary, even when absent from the
state;83 and (3) anyone who consented either in advance or by appearance in a lawsuit.84
But during this period, many businesses were being incorporated,
corporations with nationwide business were ascendant, and a truly national economy was created. The rules for personal jurisdiction over
foreign corporations were not always clear and their application was
frequently unpredictable.85 A corporation was domiciled only in the
state of incorporation and thus jurisdiction based on domicile could
not be used by other states.86 A foreign corporation could consent to
personal jurisdiction much like an individual could.87 Because in
many circumstances a state had the power to exclude foreign corporations, states often conditioned doing business on the foreign corpora80. Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428, 433–36 (1903).
81. Id. at 436–37.
82. Chester Rohrlich, Suits in Equity by Minority Stockholders as a Means of Corporate Control, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 692, 722 (1933); e.g., Harden v. E. States Pub. Serv. Co., 122 A. 705, 707
(Del. Ch. 1923).
83. Personal service was not necessarily required for domiciliaries. Rather, they could be validly served through process left at their residence in the forum state. See McDonald v. Mabee,
243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917); Scott, supra note 61, at 875.
84. See Scott, supra note 61, at 873–74.
85. Personal jurisdiction over domestic corporations was simple; the corporation was only
domiciled in the state of incorporation. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 (1882).
86. Id.
87. Scott, supra note 61, at 879.

R
R
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tion’s registering with the state and designating an in-state agent for
service of process.88
But, it would frequently happen that a corporation would have
dealings in a state where it was not registered or incorporated.89 The
corporation might not have registered for several reasons. For example, the corporation’s failure to register might have been an oversight.
Alternatively, it might have believed it was engaged entirely in interstate commerce. The states were without power to exclude foreign
corporations in these instances.90 The corporation might have also believed that its actions with the other state were insufficient to trigger
the state’s registration statute. Finally, the corporation might have
strategically failed to register simply to complicate or stave off any
subsequent litigation.
When a foreign corporation did not register in a state, personal jurisdiction over that corporation was predicated on four other theories.
First, the foreign corporation’s consent to jurisdiction could be implied from its actions within the forum state.91 Academics advanced a
second theory, predicating personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations simply on the fairness of subjecting corporations to jurisdiction
in a state for acts performed in that state.92 This theory was occasionally found in legal opinions; for example, Learned Hand and Cardozo
both espoused it. But, until it was essentially adopted in International
Shoe,93 the theory was not widely regarded as viable.
The third and fourth theories were closely related. In one approach
intellectually consonant with Pennoyer’s territoriality focus, jurisdiction was said to attach when the foreign corporation was “present” in
88. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 407 (1855); William F. Cahill, Jurisdiction over
Foreign Corporations and Individuals Who Carry on Business Within the Territory, 30 HARV. L.
REV. 676, 689–90 (1916).
89. William F. Cahill, supra note 88, at 600–94.
90. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 181–82 (1868). But, note that even in those instances, states
could require a foreign corporation to appoint an in-state agent for service of process. Int’l
Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1914).
91. Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 22–23 (1907); Lafayette Ins., 59
U.S. 404; Scott, supra note 61, at 880–81.
92. E.g., Calvert Magruder, Jurisdiction over Partnerships, 32 HARV. L. REV. 794, 826 (1924);
Scott, supra note 61, at 878; Note, What Constitutes Doing Business by a Foreign Corporation for
Purposes of Jurisdiction, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 187, 195 (1929).
93. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945); Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert,
Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 140–41 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.); Smolik v. Phil. & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,
222 F. 148, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (L. Hand, J.); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915,
917–18 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.); Bagdon v. Phil. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 111 N.E. 1075,
1077 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J.).

R
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the jurisdiction.94 Some cases took an attenuated view, holding that a
corporation was present within a state whenever a corporate officer or
director was within the jurisdiction for corporate purposes.95 Frequently though, presence was made to turn on whether the corporation was doing business within the forum state.96
The related theory (doing business) was often based on either a
truncated logic that doing business was the proper test for presence.97
Another justification for that test was the belief that doing business
within the forum state was required to meet due process.98 In other
instances, the doing business test was simply based on the language of
the state’s amenability statute without regard to any constitutional
requirements.99
Although the implied consent theory had some arguable vibrancy
until International Shoe,100 generally speaking, the key to personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was doing business.101 As early
as 1916, courts believed that clarifying the theory of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations was a chronic and important issue.102
By the end of the 1920s, this was perceived as a major issue and was
the subject of much academic analysis.103
Three kinds of tramp corporations should be distinguished. It is
clear that many, perhaps most, tramp corporations were always intended by their promoters to have their business operations in a single
state. These corporations were really local businesses that their promoters simply chose to incorporate elsewhere.104 Stockholder suits
against those corporations could typically have been brought easily in
the state where the corporation’s operations existed. Because the corporation was always intended to do business in the forum state, it
probably registered to do business there and appointed an agent on
94. See, e.g., Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 106–08 (1898); Cahill, supra note 88, at
678; Note, supra note 92, at 188.
95. Cahill, supra note 88, at 695–96.
96. Scott, supra note 61, at 882–83.
97. Id. at 881–82.
98. Note, supra note 92, at 187 (“[I]t is a fundamental requisite under the Constitution that
the corporation shall be ‘doing business’ in the state or district where the service is made to
sustain [service of process’s] validity.”).
99. See Cahill, supra note 88, at 695.
100. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
101. Note, supra note 92, at 187.
102. Cahill, supra note 88, at 676.
103. Elcanon Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1018 (1925); Note,
supra note 92, at 187; Note, What Constitutes “Doing Business” in a State?, 36 HARV. L. REV. 327
(1923); Note, When Is a Foreign Corporation “Doing Business” Within the State?, 21 COLUM. L.
REV. 362 (1921).
104. See, e.g., Troy & N. Car. Gold Min. Co. v. Snow Lumber Co., 92 S.E. 494 (N.C. 1917).
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whom service of process could be made. If it had not registered, personal jurisdiction over the corporation could nonetheless be invoked
under the theories of implied consent, fairness, or, more likely, presence through doing business. The directors and officers of such a corporation were very likely to be domiciled in the forum state, or, at the
very least, to be frequently present in the forum state to attend to the
corporation’s business. Service of process over those individuals
could, in the normal case, be effected without problem.
Note that the state of incorporation was not likely to be a viable or
even preferable venue for stockholder litigation over these local
tramp corporations. Personal jurisdiction over the corporation was of
course assured but was not substantially more certain or easier to effect than in the forum state. But, the state of incorporation was likely
to have no personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants. These
defendants were neither domiciled there nor was there any reason
connected to the business for them to be in the state. This was especially true for tramp corporations incorporated in smaller or less populous states, such as Delaware, Maine, Maryland, South Dakota, or
West Virginia, all of which had sizeable numbers of pseudo-domestic
corporations.105 For these corporations, stockholder litigation was
practically confined to the state in which the corporation actually
operated.
A second kind of tramp corporation was incorporated in one state,
its business operations were in another state, and its promoters, who
were likely to be the directors and senior officers, were in yet a third
state. This scenario could come about benignly when, for example,
eastern entrepreneurs saw a business opportunity in another area of
the country, often with an emerging economy. In one example, New
York businessmen incorporated a business in Delaware to pursue a
business opportunity in Colorado, which was an expanding market.106
In this setting a stockholder might have considerable difficulty obtaining personal jurisdiction over both the corporation and the fiduciaries in the same state. The corporation would be amenable to
jurisdiction only where it did business or in its state of incorporation.
The promoters, however, were likely to be amenable to process only
where they lived. Thus, unless the aggrieved stockholder could state
an individual claim, which could be brought directly against the
wrong-doing fiduciaries where they lived, rather than a derivative
105. See, e.g., Grandy, supra note 49, at 685 (Maryland); Yablon, supra note 49, at 333, 361
n.226, 365 n.251, 366 (Maine, New York, South Dakota, and West Virginia).
106. Wootton Land & Fuel Co. v. Ownbey, 265 F. 91 (8th Cir. 1920).
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claim in which the corporation was an indispensable party, there
might be no forum in which the case could be brought.
A slightly different dynamic affected tramp corporations that did
business on a national or international scale. In these cases, the corporation might be amenable to jurisdiction in many states. The directors would, of course, be amenable to personal jurisdiction only in
their state of domicile and wherever they could be served. If they
routinely worked in a state other than that in which they lived (e.g.
directors might work in New York City but live in Connecticut or New
Jersey) then they might be liable to service in New York as well as
their state of residence. Otherwise, service was possible only if the
plaintiff knew the fiduciaries were traveling to a state in which the
plaintiff wished to bring suit and the plaintiff could arrange for personal service within that state.
Because directors and officers naturally tended to keep their state
of residence and the state in which they routinely worked (in the case
of commuters), the feasibility of stockholder litigation turned on
whether the corporation could be made a party in the state or states
where the directors lived or worked.
Two major changes in American life between 1900 and International
Shoe in 1945 complicated the principles of personal jurisdiction. The
American economy became national in scope and American culture
became increasingly mobile.107 As a consequence, questions of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents, both individuals and corporations, became increasingly common. Further, plaintiffs became
increasingly stymied because they could not obtain personal jurisdiction over defendants in an increasing number of instances. In the noncommercial sphere, the most salient and chronic issue was the
automobile accident.108 Increasingly, an out-of-state motorist would
be involved in an accident with a resident of the state where the accident occurred. Under the classical theory of personal jurisdiction, the
resident would typically have to bring suit in the out-of-state motorist’s state of residence. Between 1908, when New Jersey adopted the
first out-of-state motorist act, and International Shoe, every state
adopted similar acts, which held out-of-state motorists amenable to

107. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160,
161–63 (1916); Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915); see also, CHANDLER, supra note
23, at 285.
108. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202 (1977).
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personal jurisdiction in the state in which the accident occurred.109
These statutes were upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1916.110
During this period, a very few states also adopted amenability statutes covering foreign corporations in lawsuits arising out of their actions within the state.111 These statutes were, in part, declaratory of
the judicial holdings that based personal jurisdiction on either implied
consent or presence via doing business, but at least one statute arguably went further by covering in-state torts even if the corporation were
not doing business within the state.112 Apparently, none of these statutes’ validity was litigated before International Shoe, and it is difficult
to know whether they had any effect.113
IV. DELAWARE’S SOLUTION: SEQUESTRATION
Delaware law provided that domestic corporations could hold
board and stockholder meetings outside the state.114 By 1915, Delaware corporations were no longer required to have at least one director who was a resident of Delaware.115
Stockholder-plaintiffs and the Delaware Court of Chancery faced a
problem that existed before but had become increasingly more important. How could Delaware exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident directors of pseudo-domestic corporations in stockholder suits?
This problem came to the forefront in 1925.116 Earle W. Hammons,
the motion picture pioneer, was sued by one of his business partners,
George A. Skinner.117 The lawsuit charged Hammons with defrauding a Delaware corporation, Educational Pictures Securities Corporation, of which Hammons was an officer and the general
manager.118 Delaware recognized the general rule that derivative
109. Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832, 836 (D. Iowa 1947).
110. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916); see also Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352,
352–53 (1927) (affirming Kane).
111. Edward W. Cleary & Arthur R. Seder, Jr., Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois
Courts, 50 NW. U.L. REV. 599, 604 (1955). Note that these statutes are distinct from the nearly
universal statutes requiring a foreign corporation doing business within the state to register and
consent to jurisdiction. See Kipp, supra note 65, at 32.
112. Cleary & Seder, supra note 111, at 604.
113. Id.
114. Act of Mar. 10, 1899, ch. 273, §§ 20, 136, 21 Del. Laws 445, 451, 502; Lippman v. Kehoe
Stenograph Co., 98 A. 943, 948 (Del. Ch. 1916).
115. Act of Mar. 8, 1915, ch. 102, § 3, 28 Del. Laws 285, 285–86 (revising requirements for
directors); See Act of Mar. 10, 1899, ch. 273, § 20, 21 Del. Laws 445, 451 (requiring at least one
director to be a Delaware resident); Lippman, 98 A. at 949.
116. Skinner v. Educ. Pictures Sec. Corp., 129 A. 857, 858 (Del. Ch. 1925).
117. Obituary, Earle Hammons, Film Pioneer, 75, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1962, at 25.
118. Skinner, 129 A. at 858.
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suits were equitable in nature.119 For this reason, Skinner filed a bill
in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Hammons was a nonresident of
Delaware and was not personally served with process within Delaware. Hammons was given notice of the suit via a subpoena sent to
him in another state by registered mail,120 which at that time would
not confer personal jurisdiction over Hammons.121
At the same time the bill was filed, Skinner obtained a temporary
restraining order (TRO) against Hammons and the corporation
preventing any transfer of Hammons’s stock in the corporation.122
Hammons entered a special appearance to challenge the assertion of
personal jurisdiction and seeking to vacate the restraining order.123
Chancellor Josiah Wolcott held that no personal jurisdiction existed
over Hammons because Hammons had not been personally served
with process while in Delaware.124 Because no personal jurisdiction
existed over Hammons, the TRO was discharged.125 Chancellor Wolcott evidently understood that Skinner’s plight was becoming more
common and needed to be addressed.126 The Chancellor noted that
Pennoyer would allow Delaware to effect quasi in rem jurisdiction by
seizure and publication, but Skinner’s suit was an action in personam
not quasi in rem.127 Even if Skinner’s bill was predicated on quasi in
rem jurisdiction, no Delaware statute made the Court of Chancery
119. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970); id., at 544, 546 (Stewart, J., disssenting);
United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264 (1917); Hawes v. Oakland 104 U.S. 450, 452–53 (1881); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 341–42 (1855); see Sohland v.
Baker, 141 A. 277, 281–82 (recognizing that the equitable nature of a stockholder derivative
action was a long-standing rule in Delaware).
120. Skinner, 129 A. at 857.
121. See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726–29 (1878) (holding that personal jurisdiction can be obtained if a defendant is served while present in the state and the property within
the state is attached before litigation).
122. Skinner, 129 A. at 858 (noting that Hammons owned 2,313 shares of the corporation’s
common stock).
123. Id. at 858.
124. Id. at 861 (“The only way the complainant can bring the nonresidents into court in a
cause of this type is to procure personal service of the subpoena.”).
125. Id. at 859.
126. A similar situation had arisen three years earlier and Chancellor Wolcott dismissed the
bill with a brief opinion. Cities Serv. Co. v. McDowell, 116 A. 4, 9 (Del. Ch. 1922).
127. Skinner, 129 A. at 860 (“[Skinner’s bill] does not seek to reach and dispose of Hammons’
stock, or of any interest therein; it seeks to impose no lien or charge upon it, nor to impress upon
it any equity by way of trust or otherwise . . . . It seeks a purely personal decree for the payment
of such money as is alleged to be due . . . .”). Skinner apparently recognized the ineffectiveness
of out of state service on Hammons because after the hearing on Hammons’s motion to vacate
service, Skinner applied for a variety of equitable processes to keep Hammons’s stock under
court control until Hammons entered a general appearance. Id. at 861. The Chancellor denied
Skinner’s application on the ground that none of them could be used as initial process but only
as mesne process. Id.
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competent to hear these cases. Oddly, the Delaware General Assembly made a superior court, but not the Delaware Court of Chancery,
competent to assert personal jurisdiction in quasi in rem cases.
From 1829 onward, shares of stock in Delaware corporations could
be attached to confer quasi in rem jurisdiction over nonresident stockholders in actions at law.128 This form of process was known as foreign attachment. Delaware made clear in 1899 that it considered all
shares of stock in Delaware corporations to be personal property located in Delaware regardless of where any certificate or stockholder
was located.129 Thus from 1899, an out-of-state plaintiff could invoke
quasi in rem jurisdiction in Delaware over an out-of-state defendant if
the defendant owned any shares of a Delaware corporation. But, the
plaintiff was limited to proceeding in a Delaware superior court, not
the Delaware Court of Chancery.
Foreign attachment of stock was principally used to assert quasi in
rem jurisdiction in cases in which the actual ownership of the stock
was not a part of the dispute, a situation sometimes called unrelated
quasi in rem. The well-known litigation of Morgan v. Ownbey130 is
both a vivid example of the use of foreign attachment and an important intellectual component relating to personal jurisdiction in stockholder litigation.131
In 1906, James A. Ownbey entered into a business venture with his
friend, J. Pierpont Morgan, and two others.132 The venture was a mining company in Colorado and took the legal form of the Wootton
Land & Fuel Co., a Delaware corporation.133 By 1909, the company
needed an infusion of $200,000.00 and Morgan apparently agreed to
put up half and to loan Ownbey the other half, the loan to be repaid
128. See Greene v. Johnston, 99 A.2d 627, 631 (Del. 1953) (now codified at DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 324 (2011)).
129. Act of Mar. 10, 1899, ch. 273, § 128, 21 Del. Laws 445, 499 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 169 (2011)); see U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 1976).
130. 100 A. 411 (Del. Super. Ct. 1916) (en banc).
131. See Obituary, Col. J.A. Ownbey, Mine Developer, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1927, at 25
[hereinafter Obituary, Ownbey] and Special to New York Times, Mystery in Morgan Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1915, at 25, for background on litigation. See also Morgan Estate Must Pay:
$53,000 Allowed to Col. Ownbey in Suit for Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1918, at 13; Sued by
Morgan Estate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1915, at 8; and Suit by Morgan Executors: Accounting of
Land and Fuel Company Asked in Denver, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1916, at 10 [hereinafter Suit by
Morgan Executors], for a description of related litigation in Denver.
132. Wootton Land & Fuel Co. v. Ownbey, 265 F. 91, 92 (8th Cir. 1920).
133. Id. Note that the corporation’s first word is frequently spelled “Wootten,” “Wooten,”
“Woonton,” or “Woortton” in contemporary reports and litigation; however, the name derives
from the prominent Colorado entrepreneur Richens Lacy Wootton, and thus “Wootton” is the
correct spelling.
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from the company’s profits.134 The company was not successful.135
Morgan died in 1913, and in late 1915, Morgan’s executors filed suit
against Ownbey in a Delaware superior court.136 The apparent basis
of the action was to recover the loan made to Ownbey.137
The suit was commenced by foreign attachment. Plaintiffs’ counsel
filed an affidavit stating that defendant was a nonresident and was
indebted to plaintiffs in an amount exceeding $50.00. Plaintiffs’ counsel then obtained a writ, as a matter of course, from the court clerk138
directing the sheriff to seize shares of stock in the Wootton Land and
Fuel Company standing in the defendant’s name up to the value of
$200,000.00.139 The sheriff did so. Plaintiffs thereupon filed their declaration that contained only boilerplate assertions that Ownbey owed
the plaintiffs $200,000.00. Ownbey’s Delaware attorneys entered an
appearance and filed an answer to the complaint.140
Throughout the litigation, Ownbey asserted that his shares of stock
in the corporation constituted the bulk of his wealth, that litigation
both in Delaware and Colorado reduced the value of the stock so that
he was unable to obtain a loan against the shares, and that therefore,
he was unable to post special bail.141 These assertions were unavailing
and a judgment of $200,168.57 was entered against him.142 This
equates to an approximate value of slightly over $4 million in today’s
dollars.143
134. Suit by Morgan Executors, supra note 131, at 10.
135. Obituary, Ownbey, supra note 131, at 26.
136. Mystery in Morgan Suit: Estate Files a $200,000 Action Against James A. Ownbey, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1915, at 5 [hereinafter Mystery in Morgan Suit].
137. Wootten Land & Fuel Co., 265 F. at 103–04. I say “apparently” because the Delaware
litigation was started with a writ of attachment, which only needed to state, in conclusory fashion, that the defendant owed the plaintiff more than $50.00; the complaint, filed in early 1916,
contained boilerplate allegations supporting a cause of action for debt. See Mystery in Morgan
Suit, supra note 136, at 5 (“[D]etails of the litigation are lacking . . . . [The] attorney for the
executors refuses to talk . . . . It is evident that details of the suit are being closely guarded.”); see
also Morgan v. Ownbey, 100 A. 411, 419 (Del. Super. Ct. 1916) (en banc), aff’d, 105 A. 838 (Del.
1919), aff’d, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (“The declaration contained the common counts. There was no
bill of particulars filed, but simply the date and amount of indebtedness.”).
138. If the procedure in these cases is a tad Dickensian, know that the writ was obtained from
one “Prothonotary Wigglesworth.” Mystery in Morgan Suit, supra note 136, at 5. Prothonotary is
the official title of the superior court clerk. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 521 (2013).
139. Mystery in Morgan Suit, supra note 136, at 5.
140. Morgan, 100 A. at 420.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 427, 434; Obituary, Ownbey, supra note 131, at 25.
143. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/
cpicalc.plcost1=200%2C168.57&year1=1916&year2=2014 (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) [hereinafter
CPI Inflation Calculator]. While the litigation was in progress, and probably in reaction to it,
Delaware repealed the requirement that appearance and defense of an action begun by foreign
attachment be predicated upon posting special bail equal to the amount of property seized, but
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The Delaware foreign attachment statute required a nonresident
defendant to post security, so-called special bail, “to the value of the
property . . . attached . . . .”144 If the defendant did not post special
bail, she could not appear and defend the action, and judgment was
entered in favor of the plaintiff.145 Plaintiffs moved to strike defendant’s appearance and pleadings under these statutes and the superior
court agreed.146 The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, the
amount of which would be ascertained at a special hearing and satisfaction for which would be limited to the shares of stock seized.147
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed148 as did the U.S. Supreme
Court.149
Morgan provided the baseline for some of the subsequent constitutional arguments. The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court principally on Fourteenth
Amendment due process grounds.150 Ownbey asserted that due process was violated because the statute did not permit him to appear and
be heard unless he posted special bail.151
Justice Pitney, speaking for the Court,152 upheld the foreign attachment scheme. He first held that Delaware’s foreign attachment
scheme was grounded in colonial and London practice, and thus, comported with due process.153 Citing Pennoyer v. Neff,154 he also upheld
the scheme as a valid exercise of power by a state over property within
it and upheld seizure as adequate notice to Ownbey.155 The Court
rather, the property would simply remain seized. Act of Mar. 23, 1917, ch. 258, 29 Del. Laws 844.
Although the statute applied retroactively to cover the suit against Ownbey, he did not avail
himself of the provision, presumably because by the time the statute was enacted, the sale of his
shares had already occurred. See Morgan, 100 A. at 417–18. On November 27, 1916, the superior court ordered sale of the seized shares to satisfy the judgment of $200,168.57. Ownbey v.
Morgan, 105 A. 838 (Del. 1919), aff’d, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). The final judgment of the Delaware
Supreme Court was rendered on March 21, 1919, after the statutorily provided window in which
defendants, such as Ownbey, could avail themselves of the new statute. No evidence in the
reported opinions suggested that the superior court’s order for sale was stayed pending appeal.
144. DEL. REV. C. § 4123 (1915) (repealed 1917).
145. Id. § 4137.
146. Morgan, 100 A. at 423.
147. Id.
148. Ownbey, 105 A. at 849.
149. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
150. Id. at 102.
151. Id. at 102–03.
152. Five other Justices concurred with Justice Pitney’s opinion and Justice McReynolds concurred in the result only. Chief Justice Taft and Justice Clarke dissented without opinion. Id. at
113.
153. Id. at 108–09.
154. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
155. Ownbey, 256 U.S. at 109–10.
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disposed of the Equal Protection Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause arguments in brief paragraphs.156
The Delaware courts then upheld the sequestration process against
constitutional challenges based in part on Ownbey and in part on
other grounds. In Skinner, Chancellor Wolcott simply assumed a sequestration statute would be constitutional under Pennoyer.157 Three
years later, in Wightman v. San Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Co.,158 he
sidestepped the constitutional issue and quashed the writ of sequestration on the ground that the statute did not apply in actions that did
not seek money damages.159
Chancellor Wolcott faced the constitutional question head-on in
Cantor v. Sachs160 in 1932.161 The plaintiffs obtained an order of sequestration over the nonresident director-defendants’ stock in various
Delaware corporations.162 The defendants appeared specially and
moved to vacate the sequestration.163 They challenged the statute on
three federal due process grounds, all going to the question of notice
to the defendant. None of the arguments was availing.164
As Chancellor Wolcott noted in Skinner, a foreign attachment procedure was unavailable in the Delaware Court of Chancery.165 Within
a year, however, the General Assembly responded by establishing a
156. Id. at 112–13 (rejecting an equal protection argument because treating nonresident individuals and foreign corporations differently was reasonable; rejecting a privileges and immunities argument because “not pressed, and plainly is untenable”). Justice Pitney also remarked
that the peculiar hardship Ownbey faced might be worthy of leniency by a court, but leniency
was not required by due process. Id. at 110.
157. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723–24 (holding that substituted service is sufficient even where the
object of the action is to reach property in the state); Skinner v. Educ. Pictures Sec. Corp., 129 A.
857, 860 (Del. Ch. 1925) (“There would seem to be no doubt that it would be competent for the
legislative power of the state to confer upon this court a power to proceed against nonresidents
after the manner of foreign attachment at law. But it has not as yet done so.”).
158. 142 A. 783 (Del. Ch. 1928).
159. Id. at 785 (“In view of the foregoing, it is unnecessary to consider the question of whether
or not the new procedure provided for by the 1927 amendment to section 3850 offends against
the due process clause of the Federal Constitution or its equivalent in the State Constitution.”).
Note that the 1955 amendment to the statute effectively broadened the statute to cover actions
in the Court of Chancery seeking any kind of relief. Act of July 1, 1955, ch. 379, 50 Del. Laws c.
379 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366) (2013)).
160. 162 A. 73 (Del. Ch. 1932).
161. Id. at 79–80. Cantor also definitively established that the sequestration statute could be
used by stockholder-plaintiffs in derivative actions. Id. at 76–78. See Cantor is Plaintiff in
$100,000,000 Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1932, at 44, for the litigation’s genesis.
162. Cantor, 162 A. at 74.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 78–82.
165. Skinner v. Educ. Pictures Sec. Corp., 129 A. 857, 860 (Del. Ch. 1925).
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comparable procedure for suits in equity.166 Although the equitable
procedure was usually called “sequestration” rather than “foreign attachment,” it permitted the claimant to seize shares in a Delaware
corporation belonging to a nonresident defendant.167
The statute read,
If it shall appear in the bill . . . that the defendant . . . is a nonresident . . . , the Chancellor shall have power to compel the appearance of the defendant by the seizure of . . . his property, which property may be sold under the order of the Chancellor to pay the
demand of the complainant, if the defendant shall not appear, or
shall otherwise default. Such property shall remain subject to said
seizure . . . unless security sufficient to the Chancellor shall be given
to secure the release thereof.168

The only substantial change in the statute was in 1955, when a provision to release the property from seizure if the defendant entered a
general appearance in the action was added.169 Prior to that change,
the property remained sequestered throughout the proceeding. The
mechanics of obtaining an order of sequestration were set out in the
Delaware Court of Chancery’s rules.
166. Act of Apr. 12, 1927, ch. 217, 35 Del. Laws c. 217 (codified with amendments at DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (2013)). See generally Wightman v. S.F. Bay Toll-Bridge Co., 142 A.
783, 784 (Del. Ch. 1928) (“The new provisions were enacted in order to obviate the effect of . . .
Skinner.” (citation omitted)).
167. Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 19 A.2d 721, 722–23 (Del. 1941).
There is no mention of the word, ‘sequestrator’ in the statute, nor is the word defined in
any rule of court. It was not the purpose of the Legislature to establish and define an
office; rather it was to confer on the Chancellor wide authority for the compulsion of
appearance and the satisfaction of decrees, leaving to him to devise, in the particular
case, the method best suited to accomplish the purpose. There seems to be no compelling reason for the appointment of any person as a sequestrator, or to give that name to
the person appointed to make the seizure. The Sheriff, who ordinarily executes the
writs of the Court of Chancery, could as well have been designated to seize and hold
the shares of stock . . .; or the shares . . . could have been held in the name of the court.
The word, ‘sequestrator’, is merely a convenient designation for the person selected to
carry out the court’s order; and whatever the appellation given, a sequestrator is merely
the court’s auxiliary, its executive agent to hold possession of the property seized under
the direction of the court for the purpose of accomplishing the statutory purposes.”).
Id.
168. Act of Apr. 12, 1927, ch. 217, 35 Del. Laws c. 217 (codified with amendments at tit. 10,
§ 366).
169. Act of July 1, 1955, ch. 379, 50 Del. Laws c. 379 (codified at tit. 10, § 366). The amendment replaced the last sentence of the statute quoted above with:
Any defendant whose property shall have been so seized and who shall have entered a
general appearance in the cause, may . . . petition the Court for an order releasing such
property . . . . The Court shall release such property unless the plaintiff shall satisfy the
Court that because of other circumstances there is a reasonable possibility that such
release may render it substantially less likely that plaintiff will obtain satisfaction of any
judgment secured.
Id.
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A plaintiff-stockholder of a Delaware corporation seeking to assert
a claim (whether derivative or direct) against the nonresident directors made, by court rule, an ex parte application to the Register in
Chancery (the clerk of the court) that contained: (1) the complaint to
be filed, which had to allege that the defendant was a nonresident; (2)
an affidavit stating the nonresident’s last known address, a reasonable
description of the in-state property, the property’s estimated value,
and the defendant’s ownership interest;170 and (3) a motion for an order of sequestration of defendant’s stock and appointing a sequestrator under the sequestration statute.171 Plaintiff also submitted a form
of order of sequestration to be signed by the court.
If the papers were complete on their face, the Register in Chancery
was required to file the complaint and grant the order for sequestration subject to the plaintiff and sequestrator posting the appropriate
bonds, which they typically did immediately. The Register had no discretion to refuse the order or challenge the merits of the action and
sequestration.172
The court papers in Shaffer provide concrete examples of the ease
with which a plaintiff could obtain sequestration of a nonresident director’s stock.173 The affidavit of the plaintiff’s lawyer was seven
pages, primarily naming the nonresident defendants, giving the corporation’s headquarters as each defendant’s last known address, setting
out each defendant’s shareholdings, and noting the closing price of the
corporation’s stock at the most recent date. The attorney obtained
this information (described in parentheticals) from the Delaware Secretary of State (names of directors), the corporation’s last proxy statement (addresses and shareholdings of the directors), and the Wall
Street Journal (closing stock price).174
The motion for an order of sequestration was one page175 and the
order granting the motion was six pages of boilerplate language.176
170. DEL. CT. CH. R. 4(db). Note that this Rule is still current although the use of sequestration is greatly curtailed.
171. tit. 10, § 366.
172. Breech v. Hughes Tool Co., 189 A.2d 428, 431–32 (Del. 1963).
173. “The facts underlying Shaffer v. Heitner were not atypical of other Court of Chancery
sequestration cases.” DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, CORPORATE AND
COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY § 3.03[b] (2014).
174. Handelman Affidavit at A29–31, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (No. 75-1812), http://civ
prostories.law.cornell.edu/chap03/shaffer01.pdf.
175. Motion for Sequestration at A18, Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186 (No. 75-1812), http://
civprostories.law.cornell.edu/chap03/shaffer01.pdf.
176. Order of Sequestration at A19, Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186 (No. 75-1812), http://civprostories
.law.cornell.edu/chap03/shaffer01.pdf.
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The sequestrator’s bond was two pages177 and the plaintiff’s bond was
three pages.178 In sum, there were five documents totalling nineteen
pages (much of it formulaic language); however none of these documents was challenged. The fourteen-page complaint was a typical notice pleading document asserting a derivative action by a stockholder
against the directors.179
By this method, over $1.5 million dollars in stock was instantly
brought under the control of a private individual, the sequestrator, to
abide the general appearance of the defendants.180 The sequestrator
and plaintiff were each required to post a bond of only $1,000.00181
equivalent to about $4,800.00 today.182 Assuming the procedural niceties were followed and that the defendants actually did own the property sequestered, the defendants could choose to appear generally,
submitting themselves to unlimited liability, or to default and forfeit
up to all of the property sequestered to satisfy plaintiff’s claim.
It was clear from the beginning, and became even more clear with
the 1955 amendment, that the statute’s purpose was not really to adjudicate the right to ownership of the defendant’s shares of stock.183
The sequestration statute, as with foreign attachment, was a method
for securing both related and unrelated quasi in rem jurisdiction. The
whole point of the statute was to provide a method for bringing nonresident directors (and other nonresident defendants) before the Delaware Court of Chancery.184
177. Sequestrator’s Bond at A32, Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186 (No. 75-1812), http://civprostories
.law.cornell.edu/chap03/shaffer01.pdf.
178. Plaintiff’s Bond at A34, Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186 (No. 75-1812), http://civprostories.
law.cornell.edu/chap03/shaffer01.pdf.
179. Complaint at A4, Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186 (No. 75-1812), http://civprostories.law.cornell.
edu/chap03/shaffer01.pdf.
180. The affidavit asserted that the defendants owned 101,753 shares of Greyhound stock and
that the closing price was $15.25 per share for a total of $1,551,733.00 Handelman Affidavit,
supra note 174, at A29–A30.
181. Order of Sequestration, supra note 174, at A24.
182. CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143.
183. Wightman v. S.F. Bay Toll-Bridge Co., 142 A. 783, 784 (Del. Ch. 1928) (“The seizure of
property of a non-resident . . . is for the purpose of compelling an appearance in the first instance.”). Wightman limited the statute’s applicability to suits in equity looking toward a money
judgment. Chancellor Wolcott stated that when the bill sought only nonmonetary relief, the
statute was inapplicable because otherwise the provision for seizing shares of stock would result
in releasing the very thing seized in order to bring the defendant into court. Id. at 784–85.
Ironically, the 1955 amendment effectively overruled that interpretation, thus allowing sequestration to be used even when no monetary relief was sought. Act of July 1, 1955, ch. 379, 50 Del.
Laws c. 379 (codified at DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 366) (2013).
184. See Cantor v. Sachs, 162 A. 73, 76 (Del. Ch. 1932) (explaining that the statute permitted
sequestration in derivative actions and direct actions); Wightman, 142 A. at 784 (“The new provisions were enacted in order to obviate the effect of . . . Skinner.” (citation omitted)).
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The 1955 amendment, however, made salient an important issue:
Could a defendant enter a limited appearance rather than a general
appearance? It had long been held that a defendant brought into a
Delaware court could enter a special appearance to challenge personal jurisdiction. In quasi in rem cases (whether related or unrelated), the question then became: Did a defendant have the option of
litigating the case but limiting any damage award to the amount of the
property seized? Three months after the amendment’s adoption, the
Delaware Supreme Court resolved that issue. In Sands v. Lefcourt
Realty Corp.,185 the court held that limited appearances were unavailable to nonresident defendants in sequestration actions.186
For fifty years the Delaware sequestration statute provided the
principal means for bringing nonresident directors of Delaware corporations before the Delaware Court of Chancery.187 It did so, even
though several constitutional challenges were raised against the
procedure.
V. STOCKHOLDER LITIGATION SHIFTS

TO

DELAWARE

A. Centers of Stockholder Litigation Before Delaware
Although by 1927 Delaware had the sequestration process in place
and upheld it against constitutional challenges, stockholder litigation
in Delaware was undesirable because there would likely be no personal jurisdiction over the directors. The directors did not live in Delaware, work there, or travel there to transact any corporate business.
This situation was as true of the other small states that rivaled Delaware for pseudo-domestic incorporations.
Bringing suit in the state where the corporation was headquartered
was more certain because personal jurisdiction over the corporation
was assured. Most likely, the corporation had registered to do business in the state. If not, the corporation surely would be found either
to be “present” or to be “doing business.” Personal jurisdiction could
185. 117 A.2d 365 (Del. 1955).
186. Id. at 368.
187. See Gordon v. Michel, 297 A.2d 420, 421, 421 n.1 (Del. Ch. 1972); WOLFE & PITTENGER,
supra note 173, § 3.03[a][2] (“Sequestration under Section 366 formerly served as the primary
mechanism by which the Court of Chancery obtained jurisdiction over corporate directors, officers, and stockholders in corporate litigation, in particular, stockholder class and derivative
actions alleging director or officer malfeasance. This process was aided materially by the existence of a statute treating Delaware as the situs of capital stock in a Delaware corporation, a
provision that Delaware, unlike the vast majority of jurisdictions, has opted to retain. Because
most corporate directors and officers own stock in the Delaware corporation for which they
serve, that ownership interest provided a ready basis for jurisdiction over such officers and directors.” (footnote omitted)).

R
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also reliably be asserted over the directors in the corporation’s state of
incorporation. Most directors visited the headquarters at least periodically and board meetings were likely held there as well. Thus, if the
plaintiff could retain nimble process servers, the directors could likely
be personally served in the state where the corporation was
headquartered.
However, a plentiful supply of directors, given that many directors
were the nominees of large financial institutions and many directors
served on numerous boards, could be most readily found in the five
financial centers of the United States. That is, Connecticut, Illinois,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York. Of those states, New
York was the easiest state in which to find directors. Not only did
many directors reside in New York City, but those who did not were
typically physically present there with some regularity.
Thus, from a combination of jurisdictional theory, practicality, and,
no doubt, path dependence, New York became the original center of
stockholder litigation by the mid-1930s.188 Centrally, New York became the center largely because it was the state in which problems of
personal jurisdiction were minimized.
As noted above, stockholder litigation exploded from the mid-1930s
onward.189 After World War II, however, New York’s public policy
changed significantly and the New York legislature took a handful of
actions designed to curb this sort of litigation. These actions included
a security-for-expenses statute, a shortened statute of limitations, and
the adoption of a contemporaneous ownership rule. The combined
effect of these actions was to reduce stockholder litigation in New
York by 96%.190
From the mid-1960s until the mid-1970s, much stockholder litigation migrated to the federal courts. The reason for this migration was
that the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the securities acts, particularly
actions under Rule 10b-5,191 to include claims for relief that traditionally had to be brought under state law. However, in a series of cases
decided in the mid-1970s, the Court retrenched its view of the proper

188. FRANKLIN S. WOOD, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF N.Y., SURVEY AND
REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE SUITS 32 (1944); Chiappinelli, Underappreciated Importance, supra note 2, at 925–27.
189. Hornstein, supra note 9, at 949.
190. George D. Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders’ Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 12–13, 12 tbl.1 (1947).
191. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2010).
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scope of the securities laws.192 By 1977, the federal courts were effectively finished as a center for stockholder litigation.193 In any event,
the federal courts never had as strong a lock on stockholder litigation
as New York.
B. How Delaware Became the Center for Stockholder Litigation
Delaware had all of the institutional requisites to become the center
for stockholder litigation. It had, of course, the Court of Chancery
specializing in stockholder litigation. By 1970, there were three judges
on that court, so jurisprudence was less ad hominem than previously.194 Since 1899, Delaware had the most modern corporations
statute.195 Further, Delaware had a relatively large body of case law.
In 1900, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that when Delaware
adopted New Jersey’s corporations statute it also intended to adopt
New Jersey’s case law interpreting that statute.196 Finally, by the mid1960s, Delaware had an active, specialized corporate bar that included
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ litigators as well as active corporate transactional practitioners.197
The substance of Delaware corporate law was cutting edge but provided no advantages to stockholder plaintiffs that other states could
not, and did not, adopt as well. Procedurally, Delaware was perhaps a
bit more welcoming to stockholder litigation than some other states.
For example, Delaware did not have a security-for-expenses statute.
Also, in the 1967 revision of the Delaware General Corporate Law
(DGCL), Delaware adopted an expanded stockholder inspection
right.198 However, neither of these advantages was unique to
Delaware.
192. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
193. Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate Law Evolution: A Delaware Judge’s Retrospective, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 141, 143–44 (2015) (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285
A.2d 437 (Del. 1971) and Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. 462).
194. William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chancery—1792-1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 846–48 (1993).
195. A WestlawNext search for cases decided by the Delaware Court of Chancery before 1971
results in over 2,000 cases.
196. Wilmington City Ry. Co. v. People’s Ry. Co., 47 A. 245, 254 (Del. Ch. 1900).
197. Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA.
L. REV. 861, 863–64 (1969); see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 692 (1974).
198. Comment, supra note 197, at 887–88 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2010)); see
also Memorandum from Irving Morris to Members of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision
Committee (Oct. 1, 1964), http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.
pdf.
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By 1960, thanks to the invention of the International Shoe doctrine,
the more difficult conceptual jurisdictional problem in stockholder litigation had shifted from jurisdiction over the corporation to jurisdiction over the directors. It was in this area that Delaware’s
sequestration provisions allowed Delaware to become the center for
stockholder litigation with an advantage other states could not duplicate. The combination of DGCL Section 169 (locating all stock in
Delaware), the 1927 amenability statute (providing for quasi in rem
jurisdiction by seizing stock), and, most importantly, the notice rule
for seizure, ensured that Delaware was the center for stockholder
litigation.199
VI. THE THREATS

TO

DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE

A. The Invention of International Shoe
As detailed above, the primary test for determining whether a state
could exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was
whether the corporation was doing business within the forum state.
Although the courts sometimes relied on the theories of implied consent and presence, the dominant formulation was whether the corporation was doing business. By the end of World War I, a pair of U.S.
Supreme Court cases had reformulated the doing business test to turn
on whether the corporation was engaged in “mere solicitation” of business or whether it was engaged in “solicitation plus.”200 The former
was not sufficient to subject the corporation to personal jurisdiction
while the latter was.
As it reached the U.S. Supreme Court from Washington State, International Shoe201 was simply another in a long line of cases deciding
whether a foreign corporation’s actions in the forum state were
enough for personal jurisdiction. Both sides in the litigation treated
the case as one solely involving the application of settled legal principles. That is, the question was whether International Shoe’s activities
in Washington were solicitation plus, and therefore, doing business.202
199. Chiappinelli, Underappreciated Importance, supra note 2, at 940.
200. See Int’l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 585–87 (1914); Green v. Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1907).
201. See Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769,
786–804 (1995), for arguably the best description of facts in International Shoe.
202. Brief of Appellees at 22–24, Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (No. 107)
(presenting two questions: (1) whether the company’s actions in Washington constituted “doing
business”; and (2) whether Washington’s unemployment tax unduly burdened interstate commerce); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 65 S. Ct. 1579 (1945) (mem.) (“The Court does not

R
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Chief Justice Stone’s opinion for the Court focused almost entirely
on this question, and nothing in International Shoe indicates that the
Court intended to overrule the system of territoriality established in
Pennoyer. Rather, International Shoe seemingly intended to reformulate the solicitation plus test for doing business to acknowledge that
the quality as well as the quantity of a foreign corporation’s actions in
the forum state might be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction.203 That standard has come to be known as the “minimum contacts” test. Justice Black, writing separately but neither concurring
nor dissenting, remarked that the case was so insubstantial that the
Court should have dismissed it rather than decide it on the merits.204
He further criticized the Court for “[announcing] vague Constitutional criteria applied for the first time to the issue before us. It has
thus introduced uncertain elements confusing the simple pattern and
tending to curtail the exercise of State powers to an extent not justified by the Constitution.”205 Ironically then, Justice Black feared that
International Shoe would limit, rather than expand, the power of
states to exert personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
The initial reaction to International Shoe by the Court and academics suggests that contemporaneous observers saw the case as incremental rather than revolutionary. The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated
that International Shoe stood for the proposition that regular and continuous solicitation of business was doing business for personal jurisdiction purposes without any intimation that the case had broader
implications.206 Academics in both law review articles and casebooks
considered International Shoe to be simply a case that modified the
standard for analyzing when a foreign corporation’s activities within
the forum state were sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.207
Nevertheless, one paragraph in International Shoe spoke about jurisdiction over “defendants” and used “he” rather than “corporation,”
which might be read as suggesting that the minimum contacts test
could or should be applicable to individuals as well as to foreign
corporations:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s
care to hear argument on the question whether the statutes attacked placed an undue burden on
interstate commerce.”).
203. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
204. Id. at 322 (opinion of Black, J.).
205. Id. at 323 (opinion of Black, J.).
206. Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 426 (1946).
207. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 347, 351, 358–59, 359 nn.62–63.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-1\DPL105.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 31

25-JAN-16

DELAWARE’S CORPORATE LAW MONOPOLY

8:39

31

person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of
court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally
binding him. But now that the capias ad respondendum has given
way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.”208

On the other hand, the Court was clearly talking about the historical
origins of the state’s power over defendants, which would naturally be
individuals rather than entities.209
The U.S. Supreme Court did not speak—even indirectly—to the
question of whether the minimum contacts test applies to individuals
as well as foreign corporations for a dozen years after International
Shoe. In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,210 Justice Black,
who had been dubitant about the wisdom of International Shoe, wrote:
“Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly
discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents.”211 During the
next Term, in Hanson v. Denkla,212 the Court applied the minimum
contacts test to personal jurisdiction over trusts and trustees.213 The
lower courts treated the issue as an open one until at least the early
1960s.214
Around the same time, several enormously influential academics
suggested, with varying degrees of depth, that International Shoe
could or should apply to all assertions of in personam jurisdiction or
even to all assertions of personal jurisdiction. Among these academics
were Paul Carrington,215 Philip Kurland,216 David Currie,217 Geoffrey
208. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citation omitted) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
209. Further, that paragraph cited six prior U.S. Supreme Court cases that all involved in
personam jurisdiction over individuals rather than corporations. Id. (citing Hoopeston Canning
Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316, 319 (1943); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); Young
v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 254 (1933); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 426 (1932); Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 353, 356 (1927); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917)).
210. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
211. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
212. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
213. Id. at 247–56.
214. See, e.g., Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 255 (5th Cir. 1962). The U.S. Supreme Court
definitively held that the minimum contacts test applied to individuals as well as foreign corporations in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 n.19 (1977).
215. Paul D. Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L. REV.
303, 306–07 (1962).
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Hazard,218 and Arthur von Mehren & Donald Troutman.219 By the
mid-1960s, the modern conception of the reach of International Shoe
was widely acknowledged, if not universally accepted. The invention
of International Shoe was accomplished.
The minimum contacts test had two potential effects on Delaware’s
advantage over other states. First, to the extent that the test both clarified and lowered the criterion for personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations, some states that might not have had jurisdiction over
foreign corporations before now did. More importantly though, if International Shoe applied to individuals as well as corporations, states
might assert personal jurisdiction over nonresident directors who
could not be served within the state. This could end Delaware’s sequestration advantage and allow stockholder litigation to flow out of
Delaware if plaintiffs thought other jurisdictions were preferable.
Delaware was unable to effect this challenge due to at least three
remaining obstacles. First, although International Shoe had been invented, not everyone was convinced. The question of minimum contacts’ application beyond the foreign corporation setting was an open
one in the lower courts as late as 1962.220 Thus, states and the plaintiffs’ bar could not be sure that states other than Delaware would have
personal jurisdiction over nonresident directors under minimum contacts until an authoritative case was decided.
Second, even if minimum contacts applied to individuals, states
needed to enact amenability statutes broad enough to grant power to
their courts to exercise that jurisdiction under minimum contacts. In
the corporate director context, this could come about in two ways.
First, a specific long-arm statute could be enacted covering nonresident directors. Second, a general long-arm statute might be construed
to cover nonresident directors of either domestic or foreign
corporations.
216. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the in Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 592–93, 598, 610 (1958) (suggesting that International Shoe was not intended to apply to individuals and suggesting that not until McGee and
Hanson were decided, in 1957 and 1958 respectively, did the Court truly provide useful guidance
as to the content of minimum contacts).
217. David P. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in
Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 536–41 (suggesting that McGee and Hanson were the keys to
informing the minimum contacts test).
218. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT.
REV. 241, 281–83.
219. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Troutman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1142–44 (1966).
220. See, e.g., Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 255 (5th Cir. 1962).
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By the time Shaffer was decided in 1977, at least eleven states had
director-specific amenability statutes or rules.221 However, only two
or three could be considered commercially important states and therefore possible threats to Delaware’s hegemony.222 At least some of the
director amenability statutes pre-dated International Shoe, though it is
unclear how frequently these statutes were used in any of the states.
Only South Carolina and Connecticut had reported cases interpreting
their director-amenability statutes.223
More pertinently, at least eight states had statutes purporting to extend personal jurisdiction over nonresident individuals who transacted
business within the forum state.224 However, these statutes (other
than the nonresident motorist statutes) were not used with any great
regularity prior to International Shoe.225
It was more than a decade after International Shoe before any state
asserted a general, expansive power over nonresidents doing business
or committing torts within the state.226 In part, this lag was due to
uncertainty over the scope and content of the minimum contacts test
itself.227 In 1956, Illinois became the first state to enact a modern
long-arm statute.228 But, twenty years after International Shoe, only
eleven states had comprehensive long-arm statutes, including: Illinois,
Michigan, and New York (but not Delaware).229 Before the end of
the decade, though, nearly one-half of the states had adopted a broad
221. Rodman Ward, Jr., A Delaware Phoenix: The Fall of Sequestration and the Enactment of
a Director Service Statute, 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 13 (1977).
222. See id., at 13–14 (collecting states).
223. Ernest L. Folk, III & Peter F. Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 749,
789–95 (1973) citing only cases from Connecticut and South Carolina).
224. F. Arnold Daum, The Transaction of Business Within a State by a Non-Resident as a
Foundation for Jurisdiction, 19 IOWA L. REV. 421, 422–23 n.5 (1934).
225. Cleary & Seder, supra note 111, at 604 (“These statutes apparently were not employed
sufficiently to bring them before the courts until the resurgence of interest which resulted from
the decision in the International Shoe case.” (footnote omitted)).
226. John M. O’Connor, Jr. & James M. Goff, Expanded Concepts of State Jurisdiction over
Non-Residents: The Illinois Revised Practice Act, 31 NOTRE DAME L. 223, 223 (1956).
227. Kurland, supra note 216, at 592–93, 598, 610 (suggesting that International Shoe was not
intended to apply to individuals and suggesting that not until McGee and Hanson were decided,
in 1957 and 1958 respectively, did the Court truly provide useful guidance as to the content of
minimum contacts); see Currie, supra note 217, at 536 (suggesting that McGee and Hanson were
the keys to informing the minimum contacts test).
228. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 110, §§ 1-101.72 (1955).
229. AMERICAN LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 376 n.2, 376–77 n.3 (1969) (listing as of May 1965: Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois,
Maine, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Washington, and
Wisconsin).

R
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long-arm statute, although of the commercially important states, only
Ohio joined Illinois, Michigan, and New York in doing so.230
Third, even with a sufficiently expansive long-arm statute, or one
specifically directed to nonresident directors of foreign corporations,
the vexing question remained whether those directors did, in fact,
have sufficient contacts with the forum state such that jurisdiction
would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.
B. The Revolution in Debtors’ Rights
From the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court revolutionized the long-standing legal relations between debtors and their
creditors.231 The implications of this revolution undermined the continued validity of Delaware’s sequestration system. However, as with
the invention of International Shoe, commentators who were not
versed in Delaware corporate law did not focus on the implications of
the revolution to Delaware, and those who were familiar with Delaware’s sequestration were mostly quick to argue that the revolution
bypassed Delaware.
Eight days before Thanksgiving in 1966, the Family Finance Corporation of Bay View, Wisconsin filed a garnishment action in Wisconsin
state court against Christine Sniadach on a promissory note she and
her then-husband had signed two years earlier.232 The following Monday, Mrs. Sniadach and her employer were served with process in the
suit and the employer withheld $31.59 of her $63.18 net wages for the
week in accordance with Wisconsin garnishment law.233 The Legal
Defense Fund made a test case of the lawsuit and challenged the Wisconsin garnishment law.234
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.235 In June 1969, Justice
Douglas held that the prejudgment seizure of wages, without providing the employee with notice and opportunity to be heard, violated
230. Id. (noting that of the commercially important states, only Ohio had joined Illinois, Michigan, and New York in doing so).
231. See infra note 239 and accompany text.
232. Oral Argument at 00:50–04:20, Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (No.
130), http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1968/1968_130.
233. Family Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach, 154 N.W.2d 259, 260, 260 n.1 (Wis. 1967), rev’d, 395 U.S.
337 (1969).
234. Oral Argument at 3:50–4:20, Sniadach, 395 U.S. 337 (No. 130), http://www.oyez.org/
cases/1960-1969/1968/1968_130; Special to New York Times, Court to Review Garnisheeing of
Pay Without Proof of Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1969, at 24 [hereinafter Court to Review
Garnisheeing].
235. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 393 U.S. 1078 (1969) (mem.) (granting certiorari).

R
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due process.236 “Where the taking of one’s property is so obvious, it
needs no extended argument to conclude that absent notice and a
prior hearing . . . this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the
fundamental principles of due process.”237 Although prior to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s opinion the case had garnered no attention in the
academic literature and little attention in the nonlegal world, the reaction to the Court’s decision was huge.238
A revolution had begun. In seven years the Court decided eight
cases expanding the rights of debtors, especially consumer debtors,
and broadened the idea of property rights.239 The most important of
these cases were Sniadach and Fuentes (decided three years later).240
Although in retrospect Sniadach contained the kernel on which the
debtors’ rights attack on Delaware sequestration would spring, at the
time, thoughtful observers saw legitimate facets of Sniadach that
could have confined the revolution to consumer settings. For example, Sniadach emphasized the fact that wage garnishment systemically
affected low-income people.241 The Sniadach Court also described
wages as “a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems
in our economic system”242 and the next two cases in the revolution

236. 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
237. Id. (citation omitted).
238. The New York Times devoted two small articles to the case before the U.S. Supreme
Court’s opinion. Court to Review Garnisheeing, supra note 234, at 24; Robert J. Cole, Personal
Finance: Wage Garnishment, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1969, at 55. The case was cited by courts over
100 times in the first two years following its decision. A WestlawNext search shows 104 citations
to Sniacach in the two years following its decision. Both the New York Times and the Los
Angeles Times reported the Court’s decision on their front pages, and the Los Angeles Times
had a banner headline. Ronald J. Ostrow, Court Voids Garnishment Laws in California, 16
Other States, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 1969, at 1; Special to New York Times, Court Voids Law on
Garnishment, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1969, at 1.
239. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (pre-termination hearing of Social Security
disability benefits); N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (prehearing
garnishment of commercial goods); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974) (extraordinary situation justifying a prehearing seizure of property); Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (prehearing sequestration of consumer goods); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972) (prehearing replevin of consumer goods); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)
(prehearing suspension of driver’s license and automobile registration); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) (prehearing cessation of AFCD benefits); Sniadach, 395 U.S. 337 (prehearing
garnishment of wages); see also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991) (prehearing seizure of
real property).
240. Fuentes, 407 U.S. 67.
241. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 340–41.
242. Id. at 340.

R
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also involved specific property rights that could be characterized as
necessities, especially for those with low incomes.243
Fuentes signaled that the Court was not limiting its due process protection to either economically disadvantaged people or to particularly
essential property rights, although the case itself involved both of
those elements.244 Fuentes was a consolidated case involving the prejudgment replevin of household goods purchased under conditional
sales contracts.245 The Court, in quite sweeping language, made clear
that “a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a
‘deprivation’ in the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.”246 Justice
Stewart, speaking for the Court, asserted, without any real support,
that Sniadach and Goldberg (the second case in the revolution) “were
in the mainstream of past cases, having little or nothing to do with the
absolute ‘necessities’ of life but establishing that due process requires
an opportunity for a hearing before a deprivation of property takes
effect.”247 He thus demolished the suggestion that the revolution
would protect only certain property, saying that the Court had never
held that the Due Process Clause “is limited to the protection of only
a few types of property interests. While Sniadach and Goldberg emphasized the special importance of wages and welfare benefits, they
did not convert that emphasis into a new and more limited constitutional doctrine.”248
Fuentes also elaborated, even if it did not clarify, a possible exception to the scope of the debtors’ rights revolution. Sniadach held that
ex parte prejudgment attachment may be compatible with due process
“in extraordinary situations” involving “special protection to a state or
creditor interest”249 Fuentes found three factors present in all the
cases in which ex parte prejudgment seizure was allowed.
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure
an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there
has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has
kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force; the person
initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for
243. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (prehearing suspension of driver’s license and automobile registration); Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254 (prehearing cessation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFCD) benefits).
244. Fuentes, 407 U.S. 67.
245. Id. at 70–72.
246. Id. at 85 (citing Sniadach, 395 U.S. 337).
247. Id. at 88 (footnote omitted).
248. Id. at 89 (footnote omitted).
249. Sniadach, 295 U.S. at 339 (citing Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594,
598–600 (1950); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253–54 (1947); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett,
277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110–12 (1921)).
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determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that
it was necessary and justified in the particular instance.250

The synthesis of the debtors’ rights cases, speaking rather generally,
is that in private litigation, a prejudgment deprivation of a property
interest must be accompanied by either preseizure or postseizure safeguards or must be an “extraordinary situation” justifying the
deprivation.251
C. Attacks on Delaware Sequestration
While the debtors’ rights revolution was in full swing, academics
and the courts began questioning the constitutional validity of Delaware’s sequestration process. Some of the arguments they used predated the first debtors’ rights case in 1969, but the attacks grew louder
and stronger after Fuentes in 1972. These attacks came within a larger
movement challenging the nearly universal state provisions for prejudgment seizure of property252 but became more Delaware focused
in the work of the great corporate law scholar Ernest L. Folk, III, who
had been253 the reporter for the revision of the Delaware corporation
statute in the mid-1960s.254
250. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91. In a footnote, the Court distinguished seizure from attachment
and characterized Ownbey’s result as “attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction in state
court—clearly a most basic and important public interest.” Id. at 91 n.23.
251.
For this type of case [i.e., private litigation], therefore, the relevant inquiry requires . . .
first, consideration of the private interest that will be affected by the prejudgment measure; second, an examination of the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures under attack and the probable value of additional or alternative safeguards; and
third, . . . principal attention to the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy, with, nonetheless, due regard for any ancillary interest the government may have
in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater
protections.
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991) (relying in particular on Snaidach, Fuentes, N. Ga.
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), and Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974)).
[Due Process requires that] an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before
he is deprived of any significant property interest, except for extraordinary situations
where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing
until after the event.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
252. See, e.g., Joseph P. Zammit, Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?,
49 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 668 (1975); Comment, Foreign Attachment After Sniadach and Fuentes, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 342 (1973); Comment, Laprease and Fuentes: Revlevin Reconsidered, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 886 (1971); Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82
YALE L.J. 1023 (1973); see also, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 85, 88–92
(1972).
253. Thomas H. Jackson et al., Tributes to Ernest L. Folk, III, 76 VA. L. REV. 1 (1990).
254. Ernest L. Folk, III, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. B.J. 409
(1968).
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In fact, prescient criticisms of quasi in rem jurisdiction itself, although not attacks on foreign attachment or Delaware in particular,
were put forth even before the invention of International Shoe by several proceduralists,255 including one of the most prominent, Paul Carrington. In this line of attack, the expansion of the states’ power to
exert personal jurisdiction beyond the traditional territorial limits of
Pennoyer meant that quasi in rem jurisdiction, of which foreign attachment (and therefore Delaware’s sequestration) was a part, was no
longer necessary to obtain personal jurisdiction over defendants except those who “ought not to be asked to defend in the forum chosen
by the plaintiff.”256 Thus, according to this reasoning, quasi in rem
jurisdiction should be eliminated.
Professor Folk seemed to have perceived no effect of International
Shoe or the proceduralists’ attack on quasi in rem jurisdiction for Delaware’s sequestration system when he worked on the revision of the
Delaware corporation statute in the mid-1960s. His extensive report
in connection with the revision of the DGCL listed five objections to
sequestration, but none was rooted in a possible constitutional objection.257 However, he was keenly aware of Sniadach’s implications on
Delaware, and in 1971, he raised four possible constitutional questions
for Delaware, two of which were based on the invention of International Shoe and the debtors’ rights revolution.258
255. Even the great Brainerd Currie weighed in, calling Delaware’s foreign attachment procedure under Ownbey “one of the more egregious injustices of modern times.” Brainerd Currie,
Attachment and Garnishment in the Federal Courts, 59 MICH. L. REV. 337, 379 (1961) (footnote
omitted).
256. Carrington, supra note 215, at 306. See Albert A. Ehernzweig, The Transient Rule of
Personal Jurisdiction: The “Power” Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Hazard, supra note 218, at 282–83; Roger J. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L.
REV. 657, 657–58 (1959); Note, Developments in the Law—State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 909, 948 (1960); Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the
Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 550, 550–51 (1967); Note, Garnishment of Wages
Prior to Judgment is a Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach case and Its Implications for Related
Areas of the Law, 68 MICH. L. REV. 986 1003–04 (1970); Comment, Podolasky v. Devinney and
the Garnishment of Intangibles: A Chip off the Old Balk, 54 VA. L. REV. 1426 (1968), for other
expressions of the same argument.
257. ERNEST L. FOLK, III, REVIEW OF THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 267–71 (1968).
The report was published in 1968, but Professor Folk prepared the section on sequestration by
April 1966. See Minutes of Thirty-Third Meeting of Delaware Corporation Law Study Committee, (Apr. 25, 1966), http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeeminutes.pdf.
258. ERNEST L. FOLK, III, An Essay on Sequestration and Foreign Attachment, in THE
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 565, 603–10 (1972). The essay was completed in
1971. See id., at 607 n.274. The two constitutional arguments he raised, which did not prove to
be significant, included: (1) a question of the requisite notice of with sequestration; and (2)
whether Delaware’s refusal to permit a limited appearance violated due process. Id. at 603–04,
606. Folk reiterated and elaborated on his concern with the limited appearance problem in Ernest L. Folk, III & Moyer, supra note 223, at 789–95.

R
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It is clear that even in 1971 Professor Folk did not see the International Shoe argument against sequestration as a strong one. Rather,
he expressed annoyance that the Delaware Supreme Court gave the
argument short shrift rather than facing it head-on and holding that, in
effect, quasi in rem jurisdiction did not require the minimum contacts
showing of International Shoe.259 After Fuentes, however, he understood the power of the International Shoe argument. In his enormously influential 1973 article published in the Columbia Law
Review, Folk and his student co-author, Moyer, devoted seventeen
pages to an examination of the invention of International Shoe’s consequences for Delaware’s system of sequestration.260
Folk and Moyer focused primarily on whether International Shoe’s
expansion of in personam jurisdiction also worked a contraction of
other forms of personal jurisdiction such as quasi in rem. They acknowledged the argument that quasi in rem jurisdiction was no longer
necessary since the development of the modern minimum contacts
tests.261 They admitted that the function of sequestration—to coerce
in personam jurisdiction over nonresident corporate fiduciaries—
made it difficult to categorize sequestration as a true quasi in rem proceeding rather than an in personam one.262 They also argued that
even though Section 169 placed all stock in Delaware, the state in
which the certificates were located, any state in which the corporation
was subject to in personam jurisdiction could also plausibly claim to
have the stock located within it as well, thus exposing the stockholder
to quasi in rem jurisdiction in a multiplicity of states.263 They also
confessed that if International Shoe were applied to sequestration, the
U.S. Supreme Court might decide that fairness requires that a single
site for stock be determined and might find that the state of incorporation was not the most fair location. In that event, Delaware’s sequestration system would crumble even though the procedure itself
would be upheld.264
Finally, the authors addressed one of the arguments in favor of upholding sequestration after International Shoe, an analogy to a line of
state and federal cases upholding a New York statute permitting suit
in New York by the state’s residents against insurance companies doing business there, even where neither the insured nor the tort giving
259. See FOLK, supra note 258, at 604–06. Folk was criticizing the Delaware Supreme Court’s
opinion in Breech v. Hughes Tool Co., 189 A.2d 428 (Del. 1963).
260. Folk & Moyer, supra note 223, at 778–95.
261. Id. at 780–81.
262. See id. at 784.
263. Id. at 786.
264. Id. at 788–89.
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rise to the claim had any connection to New York.265 Although two
years earlier Folk favored that argument,266 by 1973 he had changed
his mind and found a distinction between the New York statute and
Delaware’s sequestration in the fact that the Delaware corporation,
analogous to the insurance company doing business in New York, was
only a nominal party in corporate litigation not the real party in
interest.
Turning to other arguments in support of sequestration, Folk and
Moyer noted that sequestration had been likened to garnishment of a
debt, which had been sustained under Harris v. Balk.267 Harris owed
money to Balk; both were North Carolina residents and the debt was
presumably contracted there. Balk also owed money to Epstein, a
Maryland resident. While Harris was in Maryland, Epstein garnished
Harris’s debt owed to Balk in partial satisfaction of Balk’s debt to
Epstein.268 Harris paid money to Epstein and that payment was found
to be a valid defense to a later suit by Balk to recover from Harris in
North Carolina.269 However, Folk and Moyer noted that Epstein, the
plaintiff-creditor-garnishor in Harris, was a resident of the forum
state, and that in garnishment, the plaintiff takes the place of the original creditor (Balk in this case).270 In sequestration, by contrast, the
plaintiff is seldom (if ever) a Delaware resident and need not seek to
collect for herself an obligation owed to the corporation. These differences were enough for Folk and Moyer to conclude that the Harris
reasoning would not support sequestration against a challenge under
International Shoe.271
Despite the careful critique of sequestration in light of International
Shoe, Professor Folk saw the debtors’ rights revolution as the stronger
attack on sequestration.272 In 1971, he thought that a broad reading of
Sniadach could “inevitably condemn[ ] the Delaware sequestration
statute” if the case applied to all property and not just property of
those of modest means.273 But, in 1973 after Fuentes authoritatively
applied due process to all property, Folk and Moyer thought sequestration might still meet due process even though the debtors’ rights
265. “The controversy was initiated by Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966).
Much of the ensuing case law was discussed in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.
1968), which upheld the constitutionality of the New York procedures.” Id. at 786 n.216.
266. FOLK, supra note 258, at 605.
267. 198 U.S. 215 (1908).
268. Id. at 216.
269. Id. at 216–17.
270. Folk & Moyer, supra note 223, at 786–87.
271. Id. at 786–88.
272. See id. at 795–800 (discussing sequestration after Fuentes).
273. FOLK, supra note 258, at 608
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cases applied to the seizure of stock.274 Further, they argued that the
1955 amendment to the sequestration statute, which ordinarily required the release of the property upon the defendant’s general appearance, might be seen as a less serious taking than in Sniadach, and
therefore, a possible ground for distinction.275
Folk did not argue that Delaware’s sequestration system constituted
an extraordinary situation justifying an exception to even a broad
reading of Sniadach.276 After Fuentes, he admitted that sequestration
would not survive as an extraordinary situation in cases where it was
needed most. That is, where the defendants did not have minimum
contacts and thus where personal jurisdiction must be based on quasi
in rem principles.277
Folk and Moyer also argued in favor of Delaware jurisdiction,
though perhaps not via sequestration, in cases in which the defendant
was a nonresident and therefore arguably not subject to jurisdiction
under minimum contacts. In that setting, they argued that the necessity of providing a forum in Delaware for the resolution of cases involving Delaware corporate law, obviously of high importance to
Delaware, could be justified under Fuentes although not via sequestration.278 Rather, they saw the solution as either a system based on
quasi in rem jurisdiction, but invoked by service of process rather than
seizure, or a targeted long-arm statute.279
Folk was enough of a realist to understand that Delaware could not
save sequestration by hiding behind Ownbey. The Delaware sequestration scheme had virtually no preseizure safeguards though it contained some postseizure safeguards. For example, defendants were
allowed to appear specially to contest jurisdiction.280 Also, the norm
was release of the sequestered property upon entry of a general appearance by defendant. Finally, the defendant could obtain a hearing
on the value of the property subject to seizure.281
274. See Folk & Moyer, supra note 223, at 798 (proposing to enact either a system of sequestration initiated by service of process on the defendant rather than seizure of the defendant’s
stock or a long-arm statute aimed specifically at corporate fiduciaries).
275. FOLK, supra note 258, at 608. He conceded, however, that this difference might not be
sufficient to save sequestration. Folk & Moyer, supra note 223, at 792–95.
276. FOLK, supra note 258, at 608.
277. Folk & Moyer, supra note 223, at 767.
278. Id. at 764–65.
279. Id. at 798.
280. Leftcourt Realty Corp. v. Sands, 113 A.2d 428, 429 (Del. Ch. 1955), aff’d, 117 A.2d 365
(Del. 1955).
281. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366(a) (2013).

R
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Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of upholding the Delaware
sequestration scheme was that Ownbey282 had approved the similar
scheme of foreign attachment under Delaware law. More pertinently,
the U.S. Supreme Court cited Ownbey favorably in at least five of its
debtors’ rights cases.283
Rather amusingly, however, five Justices invoked Ownbey for four
different propositions. For Justice Douglas, Ownbey represented an
“extraordinary situation” justifying prehearing seizure.284 For Justice
Black, in his dissent in the same case, Ownbey illustrated the fact that
“[i]f a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common
consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to
affect it.”285 Justice Stewart and Justice Brennan thought that
Ownbey stood for the proposition that “attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction in state court [is] clearly a most basic and important
public interest.”286 Finally, Justice White read Ownbey as holding that
process issued “in the first instance by an agent of the State but not
from a court, followed as it is by personal notice and a right to take
the case into court, is a familiar method . . . open to no objection.”287
In the midst of the debtors’ rights revolution, especially after Fuentes in 1972, litigants and the courts288 began questioning the continued
vitality of Ownbey and the Delaware sequestration procedure. Academic commentators began seriously questioning Delaware’s sequestration procedure as well.289
The first court challenges framed the question as whether sequestration either met Fuentes’s requirements for due process or was an exception to the requirements. The U.S. District Court for the District
of Delaware upheld sequestration against the Fuentes challenge, find282. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
283. See N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 610 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 n.13 (1974); Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 613–14 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 n.23 (1972);
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); id., at 349 (Black, J., dissenting). But cf.,
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 n.5 (1971) (citing two examples of “emergency situations” but
did not include Ownbey).
284. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 339.
285. Id. at 349 (Black, J., dissenting).
286. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91 n.23 (Stewart, J.); see also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679 n.13
(Brennan, J.).
287. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 613 (citation omitted) (quoting Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29,
31 (1928)); see also N. Ga. Finishing, 419 U.S. at 610 (Powell, J. concurring) (agreeing with his
own characterization of Ownbey in Mitchell).
288. U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004, 1020–21 (D. Del. 1972), rev’d, 540 F.2d 142
(3d Cir. 1976).
289. The most influential academic pieces were Folk & Moyer, supra note 223, at 796 and
Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE L.J. 1023, 1039 (1973).
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ing that Delaware’s sequestration scheme was an extraordinary situation because its purpose was to confer jurisdiction on the court.290
The district court also based its decision on the argument that sequestration was of long-standing practice and validity in Delaware.291 The
court also regarded Ownbey as good law for at least some purposes.292
Other cases involving Delaware sequestration were resolved similarly.293 One additional argument against the sequestration system
was that the statute294 deeming Delaware the situs for the stock of all
Delaware corporations was impermissible, and therefore, no minimum contacts existed in the typical stockholder derivative case in
which none of the defendant-directors had any contact with Delaware
(and typically the plaintiff was a nonresident with no contacts as well).
A further argument was that even if the Delaware situs statute were
given effect, the presence of a defendant’s stock in Delaware, vel non,
was insufficient to give Delaware personal jurisdiction over the defendant under International Shoe and its progeny, particularly Hanson v.
Denkla.295
In Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank,296 the Third Circuit overturned
Pennsylvania’s foreign attachment statute, which was quite similar to
the Delaware foreign attachment system in Ownbey.297 While admitting that the U.S. Supreme Court’s debtors’ rights revolution cases
frequently cited Ownbey with approval, Judge Rosenn, speaking for
the court, limited Ownbey to the proposition that due process does
not require preattachment notice and hearing in foreign attachment
settings.298 Judge Gibbons concurred in an opinion more than twice
290. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. at 1020–21. The defendant also argued for a minimum contacts analysis. The court in Gregg held that the minimum contacts test was inapplicable to a situation
where a state asserted power over property located within its borders. Id. at 1020.
291. Id. (citing McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1915)).
292. Id. at 1021.
293. See, e.g., Wiley v. Copeland, 349 A.2d 211 (Del. 1975); Emersons Ltd. v. Radnay & Levi,
No. CIV.A.5028, 1977 WL 176194 (Del. Ch. June 22, 1977); Heitner v. Greyhound Corp. 1975
WL 417 (Del. Ch. May 12, 1975), aff’d, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976), rev’d, sub nom. Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
294. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (2011) (“For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment and jurisdiction of all courts held in this State, but not for the purpose of taxation, the
situs of the ownership of the capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws of this State,
whether organized under this chapter or otherwise, shall be regarded as in this State.”).
295. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (holding that a trust agreement was insubstantial to establish
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant); see Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945); Gregg, 348 F. Supp. at 1020; Wiley v. Copeland, 349 A.2d 211 (Del. 1975).
296. 530 F.2d 1123, 1142–43 (3d Cir. 1976).
297. The Pennsylvania statute in Jonnet, however, did not include the provision for special
bail that was at the heart of Ownbey in the U.S. Supreme Court. Jonnet, 530 F.2d at 1136 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
298. Id. at 1128.
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as long as Judge Rosenn’s opinion for the court.299 He emphasized his
deeply researched and nuanced view that International Shoe and its
progeny were applicable to states’ power over property as well as over
individuals and corporations.300 Presumably Judge Seitz, the third
member of the panel, preferred not to reach that issue because he
signed onto Judge Rosenn’s opinion rather than Judge Gibbons’. Perhaps Judge Seitz, who for twenty years sat on the Delaware Court of
Chancery, was not prepared to highlight the potential infirmities of a
Delaware system with which he was deeply implicated.
A few months later, a completely different panel of the Third Circuit embraced Judge Gibbons’ International Shoe approach301 and reversed the district court’s opinion in Gregg.302 Judge Aldisert’s blunt
opening states: “The major question presented in this appeal . . . is
whether the Delaware situs statute . . . comports with the constitutional requirement that jurisdiction be predicated on minimum contacts with the forum . . . . In our view, it does not so comport.”303
This, of course, was not the way the district court had analyzed the
case.
Judge Aldisert sarcastically attacked the Delaware judiciary’s upholding of the sequestration procedure.304 He analyzed Ownbey separately and noted that it had recently and frequently been cited by the
U.S. Supreme Court. But, he wrote: “Ownbey has been cited by the
Supreme Court from 1972 to 1975 to illustrate the few limited situations in which the Court historically has permitted seizure of property
without opportunity for a prior hearing.”305 He then observed that
“[t]he brute fact is that Ownbey adjudicated the constitutionality of a
statutory procedure since abandoned. While the case, incidentally,
did involve the seizure of stock, it did not adjudicate the question of
299. Id. at 1130–43 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
300. Id. at 1131 (Gibbons, J., concurring). Judge Gibbons expressed similar views three years
previously in a dissenting opinion in a case in which rehearing en banc was granted. In Baker v.
Gotz, a panel of the Third Circuit was split on the constitutionality of Delaware’s sequestration.
No. 71-2150, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8074 (3d Cir. Aug. 31, 1973) (rehearing granted, which
vacated the panel’s opinions). The majority, per Justice Adams, upheld the procedure largely on
the basis of Ownbey. Judge Gibbons dissented primarily on the ground that minimum contacts
should be applied and were insufficient to sustain jurisdiction. Id. at *61–*71 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
301. Jonnet, 530 F.2d at 1130–43 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
302. U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), rev’g 348 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Del.
1972). Although this case raised issues similar to those in Shaffer, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. U.S. Indus. Inc. v. Gregg, 433 U.S. 908 (1977) (mem.).
303. Gregg, 540 F.2d at 144 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
304. Id. at 151 (“We cannot accept the notion that the mere proliferation of unwarranted
reliances on old cases suffices to settle a contemporary issue in a dynamic field of law.”).
305. Id. at 152.
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situs; and certainly it did not anticipate the minimum contacts doctrine
of International Shoe.”306
The court then held that the minimum contacts test was applicable
to all personal jurisdiction questions, tartly reversing the district court
on that issue, giving a bench slap to the Delaware courts, and affirming the reasoning of Judge Gibbons’ concurrence in Jonnet.307 Applying the analysis to the Delaware sequestration procedure, Judge
Aldisert concluded that the Delaware situs statute, which provided
the only contact with Delaware for any defendant (or plaintiff for that
matter), was insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on the Delaware courts.308
The Delaware courts, as might be expected, were less easily convinced that International Shoe or Fuentes had eviscerated the support
for sequestration. They continued to believe, or at least hope, that
Ownbey and Cantor remained good law and supported the constitutionality of sequestration.
The Delaware courts did not consider the possible effects of International Shoe until 1962. Vice Chancellor Marvel quickly dismissed
the argument that International Shoe should govern sequestration procedure by saying:
I fail to perceive the pertinency of cases such as [International Shoe]
which have to do with the question of whether or not the contacts of
a foreign corporation with a sister state in which it is sued are such
that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are offended in permitting a suit against it to proceed. Here, we are concerned with this Court’s power over property whose situs has been
declared by the Legislature to be for present purposes in Delaware,
Cantor v. Sachs, Ownbey v. Morgan . . . .309

Delaware had, in addition to its foreign attachment and sequestration statutes, a typical garnishment statute. A Delaware superior
court held that the garnishment statute did not survive Sniadach even
306. Id. at 152–53 (footnote omitted).
307. Id. at 153. “Our conclusion that International Shoe applies to quasi in rem actions is
contrary to the district court’s . . . .” Id. at 154. “Our conclusion also severely erodes the foundation of the Delaware Supreme Court’s truncated analysis in Greyhound Corp. that International Shoe did not apply. . . .” Id. “Judge Gibbons’ analysis, a scholarly, carefully documented
history of quasi in rem foreign attachment in the federal courts, develops a thesis to which we
perceive no effective rebuttal.” Id. (citing Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130
(3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring)).
308. Gregg, 540 F.2d at 155. Note that the district court followed Gregg in Barber-Greene Co.
v. WALCO Nat’l Corp., 428 F. Supp. 567 (D. Del. 1977).
309. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 185 A.2d 762, 765 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 185 A.2d 886
(Del. 1962) (citations omitted).
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though the defendant was a nonresident.310 The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that the garnishee who challenged the
statute lacked standing, and the court did not reach the constitutional
issue (although it was reported that on remand the superior court reaffirmed its prior holding after the defendant made a special
appearance).311
Similarly, Chancellor Duffy upheld a Delaware statute providing
for suspension of a driver’s license without a hearing on the ground
that the suspension in that particular case was an “emergency situation” and therefore comported with due process.312
However, in at least one post-Sniadach case the Delaware Supreme
Court recognized that the revolution arrived. Delaware’s landlord
distress law allowed a landlord to seize a tenant’s personal property in
certain instances. In a post-Sniadach case challenging that law, the
Delaware Supreme Court sidestepped actually ruling on the question,
but said:
In passing, however, we invite the attention of the General Assembly to the possible effect . . . of . . . Sniadach . . . .
Sooner or later, if the Delaware Landlord Distress Law remains
unchanged, we may expect a case to be presented requiring our
courts to determine the validity of the provisions of the Law which
permit seizure by the landlord of the tenant’s household goods and
furniture for unpaid rent without prior notice and hearing. In the
light of the current development of the law of procedural due process, the seizure provisions of the Law may well be brought to the
attention of the General Assembly for such action as it deems
proper.313

Even after Fuentes, the Delaware courts did their best to deny that
International Shoe or the debtors’ rights cases had any implications for
sequestration. Chancellor Duffy, in Gordon v. Michel,314 simply
noted that sequestration had long been upheld and refused to entertain the argument that the debtors’ rights cases required a rethinking
of the Delaware approach.315 Relying on Ownbey, he upheld
sequestration.316
310. Mills v. Bartlett, 265 A.2d 39, 41 (Del. Super. Ct.), rev’d, Mills v. Trans. Caribbean Airways, Inc., 272 A.2d 702 (Del. 1970).
311. Mills, 272 A.2d at 703–04.
312. Broughton v. Warren, 281 A.2d 625, 628–29 (Del. Ch. 1971) (citing Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535 (1971)).
313. Downs v. Jacobs, 272 A.2d 706, 708–09 (Del. 1970) (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted).
314. 297 A. 2d 420 (Del. Ch. 1972).
315. Id. at 421–22.
316. Id. at 423 (“The result [in Fuentes], then, admits of no doubt, in my judgment: Ownbey is
still very much alive and [the sequestration statute] was and is constitutional.”). Two years later,
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The Delaware Supreme Court delicately approached the problem
of the constitutionality of sequestration with a per curiam affirmance
in 1975. The court quoted Chancellor Quillen’s letter-opinion denying
a Fuentes-based challenge on the basis of other recent Delaware
cases.317
As Chancellor Marvel noted in 1977: “While it may be that [the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer] will at some time in
the near future no longer be the law of Delaware, until such ruling is
set aside, it controls the decision in this case.”318 Two days later,
Chancellor Marvel’s premonition came true in the form of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer.319
VII. SHAFFER PUTS

AN

END

TO

SEQUESTRATION320

Shaffer arose when the Delaware Court of Chancery asserted personal jurisdiction over twenty-eight nonresident directors and officers
of the Greyhound Corporation, a Delaware corporation, and its California subsidiary, requiring them to respond to a stockholder-derivative action. The complaint asserted that the defendants were liable to
the corporation because they caused the corporation to violate antitrust laws. Those violations resulted in a civil judgment of over $13
million and fines of $600,000.00 for violating an Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) order.321 The plaintiff filed suit in the Delaware
Court of Chancery and obtained an order of sequestration against the
defendants, seizing over $1.5 million worth of stock.322 Apparently,
seven defendants did not own Greyhound shares and so were not
a Delaware superior court upheld the system of foreign attachment against an attack based on
Sniadach and Fuentes on the ground that Ownbey remained good law. The court also rejected a
challenge under International Shoe on the ground that International Shoe did not apply to quasi
in rem cases. Hibou, Inc. v. Ramsing, 324 A.2d 777, 780 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
317. Wiley v. Copeland, 349 A.2d 211, 212 n.1 (Del. 1975) (per curiam). The Chancellor cited
Gordon and Gregg as authority. Wiley, 349 A.2d at 212. Chancellor Quillen’s letter-ruling stated
that there was no reason to think there would be an extension of Fuentes or Sniadach, especially
after Mitchell. Id. at 212 n.1. The Chancellor cited Hibou favorably as well. Id.
318. Emersons Ltd. v. Radnay & Levi, No. CIV.A 5028, 1977 WL 176194, at *1 (Del. Ch. June
22, 1977).
319. 433 U.S. 186, 216–17 (1977).
320. A good description of the events leading up to Shaffer is found in Wendy Collins Perdue,
The Story of Shaffer: Allocating Jurisdiction Among the States, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES
135–40, (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008). As Professor David L. Ratner noted: “Although
the Supreme Court had quite a bit to say on the subject in its Shaffer opinion, what it said is not
very clear.” David L. Ratner & Donald E. Schwartz, The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner on the
Substantive Law of Corporations, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 641, 645 (1979).
321. Complaint, supra note 179, at A7–A10.
322. Heitner v. Greyhound Corp., 1975 WL 417 (Del. Ch. May 12, 1975), aff’d, 361 A.2d 225
(Del. 1976), rev’d, sub nom. Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186. The affidavit in connection with the sequestration asserted that the defendants owned 101,753 shares of Greyhound stock and that the clos-

R
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amenable to the sequestration statute.323 The plaintiff, Arnold Heitner, a New York resident, owned one share of Greyhound stock.324
The individual defendants made a special appearance and moved to
quash and vacate the sequestration.325 The defendants’ argument was
rather broad-based. They asserted that Section 169 of DGCL, the situs statute, was ineffective to locate the Greyhound stock in Delaware
and that, therefore, there was no property within Delaware to be
seized. Only seizure of the certificates would be effective.326 Second,
they argued that the sequestration process violated the debtors’ rights
cases, especially Fuentes and Mitchell.327 Finally, the defendants reasoned that because the sequestration procedure provided for release
of the property once the defendants entered a general appearance,
and because the avowed purpose of sequestration was to compel a
general appearance rather than to resolve a true, unrelated quasi in
rem action, the sequestration procedure was really an action in personam and must meet International Shoe’s minimum contacts test.328
As would be expected, Vice Chancellor Brown rejected all of these
arguments.329 He held that the situs statute was not unreasonable and
that a stock certificate was only an indication of property, not the
property itself.330 He then held that the defendant’s power to seek
immediate release of the property upon a general appearance met the
requirements of Fuentes and Mitchell.331 Finally, he simply asserted
that sequestration was a proceeding quasi in rem and not in
personam.332
ing price was $15.25 per share, for a total of $1,551,733.00. See Handelman Affidavit, supra note
174, at A25.
323. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 192 n.8.
324. There is quite a strong indication that plaintiff’s counsel rather than plaintiff himself was
the driving force behind the suit. Justice Powell, the Court’s resident corporate lawyer, hinted as
much with some rhetorical questions to Heitner’s counsel, and Dean Perdue also suggested this
possibility. Oral Argument at 33:23–34:00, Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (No. 75-1812), http://
www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/?1976/1976_75_1812/argument; see Perdue, supra note 320, at 141
nn.23–24 (citing Telephone Interview with Arnold Heitner (Aug. 1, 2003) and Telephone Interview with Michael Machio (Oct. 13, 2003)).
325. Heitner, 1975 WL 417, at *1.
326. Id. at *2.
327. Id. at *1.
328. Id. at *7.
329. He showed his disdain with the debtors’ rights cases by alluding to “the recent wealth of
judicial decision that has emerged from the swirling and infectious dust of Sniadach and Fuentes. . . .” Id. at *1.
330. Id. at *3–4 (“Under this theory, . . . I presume, a stockholder who lost his certificate could
not have his stock interest attached by any court, any where in the event he chose not to seek a
new one.”).
331. Heitner, 1975 WL 417, at *4–7.
332. Id. at *8.
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The Delaware Supreme Court, also predictably, upheld the sequestration process. However, the case apparently gave the court considerable difficulty. The Delaware courts pride themselves on rendering
decisions rapidly in corporate litigation, recognizing that certainty on
important legal questions in the corporate law realm is a prized virtue
because prospective business actions depend upon the settled nature
of the law. For reasons that are opaque, it took the Delaware Supreme Court a full six months after the oral argument to render its
written decision.333
Justice Duffy, who four years earlier as Chancellor rather cursorily
upheld the sequestration scheme,334 wrote the opinion for the threejustice panel. The tenor of the opinion can be gleaned from Justice
Duffy’s remark that “[t]here are significant constitutional questions at
issue here but we say at once that we do not deem the rule of International Shoe to be one of them.”335 He then rather tautologically held
that International Shoe was inapplicable because this action was quasi
in rem not in personam.336 The court dismissed the situs argument
saying “we have already determined that the shares have a situs here,
. . . and, for present purposes that is conclusive on this contention.”337
Justice Duffy analyzed the debtors’ rights cases strictly in terms of
their effect on Ownbey.338 The upshot of that discussion was the holding that preseizure notice and opportunity to be heard were not constitutionally required because the sequestration procedure was
necessary to secure jurisdiction, and therefore, an “extraordinary situation.”339 Then, just in case the court was wrong about the extraordinary situation exception,340 the court began the litany of safeguards
that made the sequestration process consonant with the new due process requirements.
In sum, the sequestration procedure is at all times under the control
of a judge; a defendant has a right to litigate compliance with the
Statute and the Rules of Court without appearing generally; if the
Court determines that there has been a valid seizure a defendant
333. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 225 (Del. 1976), rev’d, sub nom. Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (argued Oct. 15, 1976 and decided Apr. 15, 1977).
334. Gordon v. Michel, 297 A.2d 420, 424 (Del. Ch. 1972).
335. Greyhound, 361 A.2d at 229.
336. Id. at 229.
337. Id. at 236 (citations omitted).
338. Id. at 228–31. See generally Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
339. Greyhound, 361 A.2d at 231–32.
340. Id. at 232. “All of those cases involve claims by creditors against resident debtors, none
sought attachment to establish state jurisdiction which is what this appeal is all about. While that
difference may be determinative in distinguishing this case from creditor type cases, we do not
base our conclusion on it.” Id. (footnote omitted).
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may then elect to appear generally; if he does so appear he is entitled to release of the property unless plaintiff meets the statutory
terms; and a defendant is entitled to a hearing to test the reasonableness of the value of the property seized, including to the extent
pertinent, the merits of plaintiff’s claim.341

Finally, Justice Duffy addressed an argument made apparently for
the first time in the case: Delaware’s failure to permit a limited appearance violated due process. He rejected that argument on the
ground that requiring a general appearance served the legitimate state
interest of judicial economy by allowing, indeed requiring, the entire
value of a dispute to be litigated in one lawsuit.342 The defendants
took an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, which noted probable
jurisdiction.343
The Court’s analysis of the case had little to do with the Delaware
sequestration system at issue. Justice Marshall, speaking for the
Court, observed that the concept of implied consent to jurisdiction,
the development of various tests to determine the “presence” within
the forum jurisdiction of intangibles (such as corporations or debts),
and the historical acceptance of personal jurisdiction in niche situations involving some status issues, such as marriage, all undercut Pennoyer’s emphasis on territoriality as the touchstone of personal
jurisdiction.344 International Shoe was central to shifting the in personam inquiry away from territorial presence to whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum state such that asserting
personal jurisdiction would comport with traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.345
But, wrote Justice Marshall, no analogous idea invalidated Pennoyer’s territoriality principle where the dispute involved in rem or
quasi in rem jurisdiction rather than in personam jurisdiction.346
341. Id. at 234. See generally id. at 232–35 (setting out the court’s assessment of constitutional
safeguards).
342. Id. at 235.
343. Prior to 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction in certain instances in
addition to its power to grant writs of certiorari. In theory, the Court was required to hear and
decide procedurally valid appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012). In function, however, by the time of
Shaffer, the Court treated these appeals as discretionary, just as it did with certiorari writs.
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision
could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court . . . .
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
and the decision is in favor of its validity.
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012).
344. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 201–03 (1977).
345. Id. at 203–04.
346. Id. at 205.
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Some academicians and a handful of recent cases, though, had remarked metaphysically that in rem and quasi in rem actions were really like in personam actions in that “[t]he phrase, ‘judicial jurisdiction
over a thing’, is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction
over the interests of persons in a thing.”347 In something of a non
sequitur, Justice Marshall then concluded: “We think that the time is
ripe to consider whether the standard of . . . International Shoe should
be held to govern actions in rem as well as in personam.”348
The main reason for extending International Shoe to actions in rem
and quasi in rem, wrote Justice Marshall, is that those actions really
involved the rights of persons just as in personam actions do.349 The
presence of property may itself be a contact with the state going to
whether sufficient contact exists to meet the International Shoe test,
and in true in rem and related quasi in rem cases may well be sufficient, but property vel non is not sufficient.350 In unrelated quasi in
rem cases where the purpose of seizing property is to compel the defendant to submit to personal jurisdiction, apparently Justice Marshall’s unarticulated premise was that intellectual symmetry required
applying the International Shoe test. He wrote, “if a direct assertion
of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would violate the Constitution [under International Shoe], it would seem that an indirect assertion of that jurisdiction [via unrelated quasi in rem] should be equally
impermissible.”351
Here, a small difficulty for the Court arose. Because neither the
defendants’ theory nor the Delaware courts’ analysis was grounded in
an International Shoe analysis, the Court did not have much information upon which to decide whether the Shaffer defendants had sufficient contacts with Delaware to validate in personam jurisdiction
under International Shoe. Further, the Delaware courts made it clear
that they were not applying International Shoe and made no factual
findings as to any contacts with Delaware.
In the U.S. Supreme Court, defendants noted that none of the
plaintiffs resided in Delaware and observed that the plaintiffs could
not point to any act by any defendant that occurred in Delaware.352
347. Id. at 207 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS introductory note to § 56 (AM. LAW INST. 1971)).
348. Id. at 206.
349. Id. at 207.
350. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207–08.
351. Id. at 209.
352. Appellants’ Brief on the Merits at 20–21, Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186 (No. 75-1812), http://civ
prostories.law.cornell.edu/chap03/shaffer01.pdf; Appellants’ Reply Brief on the Merits at 11–12,
Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186 (No. 75-1812), http://civprostories.law.cornell.edu/chap03/shaffer01.pdf.
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The plaintiff described what it believed to be Delaware’s interest in
resolving disputes involving the internal affairs of its corporations but
did argue that the Delaware corporation statute provided for indemnification and interest-free loans to directors, and thus, by accepting directorships, the defendants enjoyed benefits of Delaware law.353
The oral argument did not shed much additional light on the question of the defendants’ contacts with Delaware. With twelve minutes
to go in the hour-long argument, Justice White asked plaintiff’s counsel a series of questions going to whether the defendants had any ties
with Delaware other than stock ownership.354 It seemed likely that
the thrust of the questions was not to establish whether minimum contacts existed, but rather to determine whether sustaining the sequestration procedure was necessary to give Delaware personal
jurisdiction in any circumstance. That is, to determine whether this
case required affirmance to effect jurisdiction as an extraordinary circumstance. Plaintiff’s counsel did not detail any connections to Delaware other than stock ownership.355
So, an unrelated quasi in rem case begun by ex-party sequestration
and challenged principally on the grounds that: (1) no property that
could be seized was located within the forum state; and (2) any seizure
was, in light of the debtors’ rights cases, constitutionally infirm because of the lack of safeguards to protect the property rights of the
nonresident owners, was to be decided on the ground that the defendants had insufficient contacts with the forum state to permit that state
to exercise personal jurisdiction over them without offending traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Some Justices would have preferred to remand the case either to
dismiss or for further proceedings if Heitner could show minimum
contacts.356 However, a majority of the Justices addressed the minimum contacts question.357
353. Appellee’s Answering Brief at 13–15, Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186 (No. 75-1812), http://civpro
stories.law.cornell.edu/chap03/shaffer01.pdf.
354. Oral Argument, supra note 324, at 12:00–14:15.
355. Id. at 52:20–56:10.
356. See, e.g., Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Justice Thurgood A. Marshall
(May 18, 1977), http://civprostories.law.cornell.edu/chap03/shaffer03.pdf; Letter from Justice
Potter Stewart to Justice Thurgood A. Marshall (May 18, 1977), http://civprostories.
law.cornell.edu/chap03/shaffer03.pdf.
357. See, e.g., Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Thurgood A. Marshall (May
31, 1977), http://civprostories.law.cornell.edu/chap03/shaffer04.pdf; Letter from Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. to Justice Thurgood A. Marshall (May 31, 1977), http://civprostories.law.cornell.edu/
chap03/shaffer04.pdf; Letter from Justice Byron R. White, to Justice Thurgood A. Marshall (May
18, 1977), http://civprostories.law.cornell.edu/chap03/shaffer03.pdf.
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Apparently believing that the best defense is a good offense, Justice
Marshall began his opinion by pretending that the main issue was International Shoe and minimum contacts.
Appellants contend that the sequestration statute as applied in this
case violates . . . Due Process . . . both because it permits the state
courts to exercise jurisdiction despite the absence of sufficient contacts among the defendants, the litigation, and the State of Delaware and because it authorizes the deprivation of defendants’
property without providing adequate procedural safeguards. We
find it necessary to consider only the first of these contentions.358

Justice Marshall assumed that if minimum contacts existed, Delaware’s sequestration statute and rule would be sufficient to make defendants amenable to the case although no such amenability was
stated or intended by the statute.359 The oral argument made clear
Delaware’s view: without sequestration the defendants were not amenable to personal jurisdiction,360 a point Justice Brennan noted.361
The Court rejected Heitner’s suggestion that Delaware’s interest in
overseeing domestic corporations was a sufficient contact. Justice
Marshall correctly held that a state’s interest for choice of law purposes is not the same as personal jurisdiction.362
Likewise and presciently, Justice Marshall dismissed plaintiff’s argument that serving as a director, vel non, is a sufficient contact even
with the benefits plaintiff noted in his brief (i.e. the possibility of indemnification and interest-free loans). Rather, that interest is sufficient for choice of law purposes but not personal jurisdiction
purposes. Again, presciently, Justice Marshall held that serving, vel
non, was not “purposefully availing” oneself of the privilege of conducting activities within Delaware. Nor did simply owning securities
of Delaware corporations constitute a sufficient contact.363
Justice Powell concurred but wrote to suggest that some kinds of
property may be so permanently situated in a state that, vel non, minimum contacts exist. He explicitly agreed with Justice Marshall that
“appellants’ . . . positions as directors and officers of a Delaware corporation can[not] provide sufficient contacts to support the Delaware
courts’ assertion of jurisdiction in this case.”364
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189.
Id. at 213 n.40 (1977).
Oral Argument, supra note 324, at 52:20–56:10.
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 219–21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 213–15.
Id. at 215–17.
Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Justice Brennan, alone among the Justices, would have upheld minimum contacts in this case if Delaware were to enact an amenability
statute coterminous with the Due Process Clause. He would conflate
the choice of law and personal jurisdiction analyses, and thus, give
significant weight to Delaware’s interest in overseeing its own corporations as a factor going to whether personal jurisdiction over nonresident directors would offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. Somewhat paradoxically, given his expansive notion of personal jurisdiction, Justice Brennan was seriously dubitant
about a state asserting jurisdiction by consent.
Nor would I view as controlling or even especially meaningful Delaware’s failure to exact from appellants their consent to be sued.
Once we have rejected the jurisdictional framework created in Pennoyer v. Neff, I see no reason to rest jurisdiction on a fictional outgrowth of that system such as the existence of a consent statute,
expressed or implied.365

Justice Brennan looked even further into the future in the footnote
to that statement and spoke to the question of whether service as a
director should, eo ipso, make one expect to be haled into court in the
corporation’s state of incorporation.
Admittedly, when one consents to suit in a forum, his expectation is
enhanced that he may be haled into that State’s courts. . . . But
whatever is the degree of personal expectation that is necessary to
warrant jurisdiction should not depend on the formality of establishing a consent law. Indeed, if one’s expectations are to carry such
weight, then appellants here might be fairly charged with the understanding that Delaware would decide to protect its substantial interests through its own courts, for they certainly realized that in the
past the sequestration law has been employed primarily as a means
of securing the appearance of corporate officials in the State’s
courts. Even in the absence of such a statute, however, the close and
special association between a state corporation and its managers
should apprise the latter that the State may seek to offer a convenient forum for addressing claims of fiduciary breach of trust.366

But no sooner did Justice Brennan suggest that consent and defendant’s expectations were insufficient to assert personal jurisdiction
over nonresident directors, than he wrote:
Crucial to me is the fact that appellants voluntarily associated themselves with the State of Delaware, “invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,” by entering into a long-term and fragile
relationship with one of its domestic corporations. They thereby
elected to assume powers and to undertake responsibilities wholly
365. Id. at 227 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
366. Id. at 227 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
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derived from that State’s rules and regulations, and to become eligible for those benefits that Delaware law makes available to its corporations’ officials. [again, citing only the possibility of
indemnification and interest-free loans] . . . I thus do not believe
that it is unfair to insist that appellants make themselves available to
suit in a competent forum that Delaware might create for vindication of its important public policies directly pertaining to appellants’
fiduciary associations with the State.367

So for Justice Brennan, service as directors was an insufficient contact as was the fact that they might well anticipate being sued in Delaware, but service as directors where they might be indemnified or
receive interest-free loans was a sufficient contact.
VIII. CODA: DELAWARE AFTER SHAFFER
The Delaware General Assembly in fact responded within two
weeks to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer. Delaware
adopted the current method of obtaining personal jurisdiction over
directors: a director amenability statute (Section 3114) ostensibly
predicated on implied consent.368 Perhaps the easiest solution for
Delaware would have been either a broad long-arm statute or a specific amenability statute for directors based on the director’s minimum
contacts rather than her fictitious implied consent.369
The General Assembly enacted a broad long-arm statute one year
after adopting Section 3114. The Delaware courts have consistently
found that nonresident directors’ actions do not fall within any of the
provisions of that long-arm statute, though, a result consonant with
that of other states that have adopted similar long-arm provisions.
Why Delaware adopted a statute based on implied consent rather
than on minimum contacts is unknown.370 In any event, Delaware remained the center of stockholder litigation—although its current status may be under attack—and its continued success is perhaps a bit
precarious.371

367. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 227–28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 557 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
368. See generally Chiappinelli, Myth, supra note 5, at 797 (discussing the process of
adoption).
369. See, e.g., Folk & Moyer, supra note 223, at 798–800.
370. Chiappinelli, Underappreciated Importance, supra note 2, at 944–45.
371. See id.
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